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This thesis explores two topics related to cattle producers: the adoption of afforestation on 
pastureland and the use of pasture management practices. Chapter 1 uses a triple hurdle model to 
analyze a decision process related to the adoption and acreage enrollment of afforestation in a 
hypothetical program. The results suggest that producers interested in afforestation are more 
likely to have a college degree, own woodland, attend extension workshops, and have previous 
experience with afforestation. Producers who were offered a lower incentive enrolled more acres 
in the hypothetical program. Producers who were offered a higher incentive enrolled fewer acres.  
 Chapter 2 analyzes the use of ten pasture management practices. These practices were 
then categorized into three subgroups based on the type of practice: riparian health, soil fertility 
management, and other types of practices. Adoption of these practices were compared with 
univariate statistics and analyzed using a trivariate probit regression. The results of the trivariate 
probit regression revealed that ownership of woodland, extension workshop attendance, and 
average annual precipitation were significant predictors of adoption. As the results demonstrate, 
extension workshops have a large positive effect on the conservation behavior of cattle 
producers. Producers who are most interested and willing to adopt and use these practices are 
those who are most likely to attend to attend extension workshops. Therefore, extension 
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 This thesis contains two chapters related to the adoption and use of conservation practices by 
cattle producers. The first chapter analyzes the adoption of afforestation on pastureland, given a 
hypothetical incentive program. Chapter 2 examines the current use of ten pasture management 
practices.  Both chapters provide a unique opportunity to examine cattle owner behavior and 




















































The agricultural sector is under mounting political pressure to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. The beef industry, in particular, is often singled out for its disproportionate GHG 
emissions rate compared with other agricultural production. For example, on a pound for pound 
basis, the production of beef emits ten times more GHG than the production of chicken. One way to 
mitigate atmospheric carbon accumulation is to create sinks or environmental structures that 
sequester GHG. On agricultural land, sinks can be created by maintaining quality pasture land or 
planting trees. Research suggests that sequestration on agricultural lands has the potential to offset a 
significant portion of the GHG emissions from agricultural production. Afforestation of pastureland 
is a practice that could affect GHG emission from beef production.  
This chapter analyzes the willingness of beef cattle producers in the eastern U.S. to afforest 
pastureland. Using data from over 2,000 respondents to a mail survey that included a choice 
experiment with a hypothetical incentive program, willingness to afforest pastureland is analyzed 
using a triple hurdle model and a conditional mixed process model. The survey included questions 
regarding producer characteristics and attitudes, and previous and present conservation behavior. The 
triple hurdle in the model is comprised of results from questions focusing on general interest in 
afforestation, willingness to afforest given a hypothetical incentive level (annual per acre payments 
of $60, $90, $120, $150, or $180), and intensity of afforestation.  
Percent of income from cattle production, education, previous afforestation and ownership of 
woodlands are all significant variables in the first hurdle, which asks about general interest in 
afforestation. In the second hurdle, which is based on willingness to afforest given a hypothetical 
incentive level, incentive payment level and respondent’s age are significant. The regional variables, 
latitude and longitude coordinates, are significant in the third hurdle, which is concerned with the 
numbers of acres a respondent is willing to enroll in the hypothetical program. These results can be 
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used to better understand producer willingness to afforest and can help in establishing successful 
afforestation programs in the future.   
Problem Identification and Explanation 
 
The accumulation of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG) is causing changes in the world’s 
climate (USEPA 2013). Agriculture contributes between six and nine percent of all United States 
GHG emissions (USEPA 2013; Lewandrowski et al. 2004). The majority of GHG emissions from 
agriculture are nitrous oxide (NO and methane (CH. Beef production is responsible for a 
disproportionate share of emissions (USEPA 2013). For example, on a pound-for-pound basis, the 
production of beef emits ten times more GHG than the production of poultry (Jones, Kammen, and 
McGrath 2008).   
The concentration of atmospheric GHG can be reduced in one of two general ways: decreasing 
GHG emissions or sequestering GHG into sinks such as oceans, soils, or forests. For example, in 
beef production, net GHG reduction could be achieved by either decreasing cattle production, 
thereby reducing methane emissions, or by increasing the carbon storage capacity of pasture land. 
One way to increase the sequestration of carbon on agriculture lands is to reallocate agricultural land 
to grassland, scrub, or forests (USEPA 2013; Gasson and Potter 1988; Paustian et al. 2006).  
 For all these reasons, there is currently an increased focus on agricultural and forestry offsets 
designed to reduce GHG emissions from agricultural production and increase the sequestration of 
carbon by agricultural lands. For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, which 
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 but not the Senate, aimed to reduce U.S. GHG 
emissions 17 percent by 2020, by among other things,  increasing the amount of total forested acres 
(U.S. Congress 2009).1 The American Power Act, introduced by Senators John Kerry and Joe 
                                                          
1
 Other reduction strategies included renewable requirements for utilities, studies and incentives regarding new 




Lieberman, aimed to reduce GHG emissions 83 percent by 2050 through a regulatory cap and trade 
program. The act emphasized the need for carbon offset programs, specifically on grazing and forest 
land, to create incentive programs through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 
encourage participation and support (U.S. Congress 2009). 
Research suggests that sequestration can offset a significant portion of the GHG emissions from 
agricultural production (Paustian et al. 2006; Woodberry, Smith, and Heath 2007). Agricultural soils 
sequester 12 million metric tons of carbon per year (Paustian et al. 2006), but the amount could be 
much greater with changes in prevailing land use practices. Removing land from intensive 
agricultural production through land use diversion can increase carbon storage capacity and reclaim 
lost habitat and productivity (Gasson and Potter 1988). The adoption of best management practices 
(BMPs) such as no-till, erosion control, and riparian buffers can increase carbon storage in soils and 
improve land productivity (Kim, Gillespie and Paudel 2005). The effects of forest management 
practices on carbon sequestration rates have been extensively researched (Canadell and Raupach 
2008; Hoen and Solberg 1994; Jandl et al. 2007; Michetti and Rosa 2012). Afforestation has received 
some attention in the U.S. (e.g. Niu and Duiker 2006; Stanturf, Schweitzer, and Gardiner 1998), but 
more attention has been given to this practice in Europe, Africa, and Asia (e.g. Schirmer and Bull 
2014; Marey-Pérez and Rodríguez-Vicente 2009; Saliu, Alao, and Oluwagbemi 2010; Ni Dhubháin 
and Greene 2009;  Xu 1995).  
Although forests and agriculture are not traditionally seen as related enterprises, incorporating 
forests into agricultural production may effectively mitigate the effects of climate change. Forests 
generally sequester carbon at higher rates than other land uses.2 In the U.S., forests account for 90 
                                                          
2 Increasing the sequestration of GHG emissions by forests can also occur though reforestation, 
avoided deforestation, and improved forest management (Bull and Thompson 2011). In the U.S, 
avoided deforestation is not necessarily a concern, because most deforestation occurred prior to the 
twentieth century, and total forest area has remained relatively stable ever since. Although number of 
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percent of carbon sequestration, while covering about 30 percent of U.S. land area (Woodbury, 
Smith, and Heath 2007). Afforestation, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate 
Change (IPCC), is “the establishment of forest on land that has been without forest for a period of 
time and was previously under a different land use” (Watson 2000). Research suggests that 
afforestation can be a cost-effective GHG mitigation strategy (Moulton and Richards 1990; Parks and 
Hardie 1995). Although the rate of sequestration fluctuates depending on climate, ground 
management, soil, and tree species (USEPA 2013; Niu and Duiker 2006), afforestation has the 
potential to sequester relatively large amounts of carbon (Graham, Wright, and Turhollow 1992; Xu 
1995).  
Lewandrowski et al. (2004) found that afforestation on grazing land could sequester more 
carbon than other practices such as reduced pasture fertilizer use, rangeland management, and 
pastureland management. Birdsey (1996) predicted that afforested pasture could sequester between 
0.73 and 2.09 Mt/acre, while Follett, Kimble and Lal (2001) estimated grazing management practices 
could sequester 0.30 to 1.30 Mt/acre (Lewandrowski et al. 2004). Feng et al. (2006) looked at 
incentive payments offered to farmers for enrolling land into either land retirement programs or 
changing practices on working land. Their results suggest that converting land to forests is more cost-
effective in reducing atmospheric GHG than adopting conservation practices on working farmland.   
Despite potential benefits, afforestation has some potential drawbacks. According to Ciscell 
(2010), carbon offset programs, such as afforestation projects, have the potential to be ineffectual, 
have adverse environmental effects, and distract attention from the need to decrease emissions. 
Nonetheless, afforestation projects are likely to remain part of the climate mitigation portfolio 
(Schirmer and Bull 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
forested acres decreased from the years 1949 to 1997, between the years 2002 and 2007, the amount 




Afforestation could be accomplished either through regulation or voluntary incentive 
programs (Ribaudo, Hansen, and Hellerstein 2011). For example, the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX) is a voluntary trading program that incentivizes carbon sequestration. While afforestation can 
be economical, especially on marginal land (Moulton and Richards 1990), incentivizing afforestation 
projects remains challenging (Parks and Hardie 1995). Given the difficulties of measuring carbon 
sequestration from afforestation across diverse geographical landscapes, some researchers conclude 
that market-based trading may not be practical (e.g. Antle et al. 2000). Thus, policies are likely to 
rely on per acre payments for specified land use changes or land use management, such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a buy-out program created by the USDA that is structurally 
similar to a potential carbon sequestration program (Shoemaker 1989). The primary goal of the CRP 
is to reduce soil erosion by taking marginal land out of production. Unlike BMP adoption, 
afforestation usually eliminates other productive land uses. As a result, voluntary programs that aim 
to increase forested acres typically provide start-up costs and reimbursements for the opportunity 
costs associated with taking land out of agricultural production (McCarl and Callaway 1995).  
 This study seeks to enhance understanding of cattle producer attitudes toward afforestation 
and participation in a voluntary incentive program to promote afforestation. In 2002, 782 million 
acres of land (35 percent) of total U.S. land area was pastureland. Thus, there is ample opportunity 
for widespread afforestation of pastureland. There is also precedent, as extensive amounts of grazing 
land have been converted to wildlife, recreational, and environmental uses since the 1940s 
(Lubowski et al. 2006). Further, through practices such as management intensive grazing (MIG), less 
land can be devoted to pasture grazing without reducing cattle production (Gillespie, Kim, and 
Paudel 2007). In addition, research finds that many land users underutilize their pasture acres, 
resulting in inefficient use of forage and foregone revenues (Lyons and Machen 2001). Utilizing 
pastureland efficiently means maintaining a balance between maximizing stocking densities while 
not exceeding the land’s carrying capacity.    
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To design and implement a voluntary policy that is cost effective and reduces the GHG 
emissions associated with cattle production, it is important to understand cattle producer attitudes 
regarding carbon sequestration and afforestation. Knowledge of markets and payments is important 
for determining the factors influencing afforestation adoption, but little is known about cattle 
producer willingness to convert land to forest and how this willingness varies across producer and 
farm characteristics and cost-share incentives. Afforestation is often targeted at small, private 
landowners, so understanding characteristics of these producers is essential in understanding 
adoption behavior (Schirmer and Bull 2014).  
Research Objectives  
 
The primary objective of this research is to estimate the willingness of cattle producers east 
of the 100th meridian to convert pasture land to forest. This research also analyzes how producer 
willingness to adopt afforestation varies across demographic and farm characteristics (e.g. income, 
geographic location, age, etc). Cattle producer’s acreage response to cost share incentives for 
conversion to forestland is estimated.  
Literature Review  
 
Afforestation can productively use marginal land, improve water quality, and provide 
supplemental income to farmers through conservation program payments and timber sales (Howley 
2013; Plantinga and Wu 2003; Plantinga, Alig, and Cheng 2001). When looking at potential 
afforestation adoption rates among cattle producers, there are several strands of literature to consider.  
In addition to the literature related to the adoption of afforestation, forest owner motivations and 





There are several studies that examine the adoption of land use change, including 
afforestation, for the purpose of carbon sequestration. Schirmer’s and Bull’s (2014) study examines 
private landholder willingness to afforest for carbon sequestration in a hypothetical program in 
Australia. Using survey data, several willingness to afforest factors were analyzed: social 
acceptability of afforestation, landowner knowledge of afforestation, attributes of afforestation, and 
land and landowner characteristics. The results indicated that 13.6 percent of respondents were 
actively thinking about afforestation and that producers are open to afforestation as long as it does 
not interfere with their current level of agricultural production. Generally, producers were more 
willing to afforest if they enrolled small parcels of marginal land as compared with large ones. 
Landholder beliefs also played a significant role in willingness to afforest; agrarian priorities were 
important to respondents and the results suggest that afforestation is counterintuitive to a 
“productivist ethic.” Schirmer and Bull argue that afforestation programs should be developed in a 
way that will not challenge farmer attitudes or detract from food production.  
In a study of Canadian farmers, Shaikh, Sun, and van Kooten (2007) analyzed the probability 
of landowner participation and willingness to accept (WTA) payments for a program promoting 
afforestation. The results suggested that farmers are unwilling to convert agricultural land to forest 
without financial incentives. However, farmers were willing to convert land into forests for payments 
for less than the returns from agricultural production. The authors proposed that non-timber forest 
amenities, such as shade, improved water quality, and wildlife habitat, may explain why producers 
are willing to accept a lower return. The results also found that WTA is positively correlated with 
producer age and negatively correlated with income. The level of education was found to positively 
influence adoption rates. The authors also asserted that foregone returns from agricultural production 
do not measure the willingness to convert land to forest because: 1) there are geographic and climate 
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variations, 2) financial returns from trees are long-term, causing a disruption in liquidity, and 3) 
farmers have differing opinions toward forests and agricultural land. The authors recommended that 
landowners be compensated based on their WTA instead of estimated net returns, as some farmers 
receive benefits from the positive externalities associated with planting trees. Plantinga (2003) points 
out that these benefits are not typically taken into consideration in abatement cost estimates. 
However, as Tassone, Wesseler, and Nesci (2003) found, afforestation is unprofitable for farmers 
unless governments can provide subsidies, as in the case of afforestation programs in the European 
Union. 
Several studies examined forest owner participation in conservation programs through 
surveys of forest owners. Dickinson et al. (2012) estimates the probability of forest owners 
participating in carbon offset programs. They find that forest owners are less likely to participate if 
there is a large time commitment or the program requires an intricate management plan. Similarly, 
Kilgore et al. (2008) find several factors influenced participation in a carbon sequestration program: 
awareness of the program, compensation amount, total acres owned, and “opposition to the 
program’s land covenant.” Even so, they find that participation rates can be increased by raising 
awareness and increasing payments. Langpap (2004) argue that participation in forestry programs 
can be increased by targeting younger producers interested in conservation and creating wildlife 
habitat.  
Studies examining landowner motivation for converting land to forest may also provide 
insights into the characteristics that are likely to influence producer willingness to afforest 
pastureland. A number of these studies have focused on Irish landowners (i.e., Frawley and Leavy 
2001; Kearney 2011; Ní Dhubháin and Gardiner 1994; Ní Dhubháin and Greene 2009; Howley 
2013). In a review of the literature related to farmer attitudes toward forestry, Kearney (2001) found 
that the most important factor affecting afforestation over time is its profitability as a land use option. 
The author concludes that cattle production is in direct competition with acres that could be forested. 
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Frawley and Leavy (2001) find a similar result from a survey analyzing the factors that influenced 
farmers to convert some portion of their land to forest. More than half of the respondents perceived 
forestry favorably. Reasons given for not afforesting included “farm too small” and “prefers to 
farm.” Nonetheless, for those respondents who had afforested, maximizing land value was cited as 
the main reason, and 90 percent of farmers who had converted land to forest indicated they were 
happy with their experience. The authors suggest that lack of tradition and knowledge of forestry 
practices may explain why afforestation is a low preference land use option for producers. Ní 
Dhubháin and Gardiner (1994) studied farmer attitudes toward forestry and factors that influence the 
decision to afforest by surveying people who previously planted trees. The most-frequently cited 
reason for afforestation was to provide shelter for cattle followed by financial reasons. Eighty-four 
percent of respondents maintained that neither their farm output nor workloads were affected by 
afforesting. Lack of suitable land and limited land resources were the most common reasons why 
people did not afforest. Ní Dhubháin and Greene (2009) found that landowners afforested to “use up 
marginal land” and because of financial opportunities. “Ecological value,” “cover for game and 
wildlife,” and “to produce timber for sale” were among some of the other reasons to convert land to 
forest. Howley (2013) looked at factors that influence forest owner forest management. His results 
showed that sorting forest owners into groups based on their ownership objectives (i.e. lifestyle, 
economic, and multifunctional) allowed for policy makers to effectively influence forestry adoption. 
Collectively, these Irish studies suggest that while the decision to afforest agricultural lands is 
primarily motivated by financial concerns, farmers do view forested lands differently than they view 
agricultural land.  
Other studies explain willingness to afforest. Zubair and Garforth (2006) found that farmer 
willingness to plant trees is related to their attitudes toward forestry. In this Pakistani study, farmers 
who planted trees believed that the financial and economic benefits were greater than the “adverse 
effects.” The influence of peer pressure, such as the opinions of family members, friends, and 
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politicians, was also found to influence tree planting. Results show that farmers planted trees to 
increase income, provide firewood, provide ecological benefits, and because costs were low. Saliu, 
Alao, and Oluwagbemi (2010) evaluated participation in a Nigerian afforestation program. The 
authors determined that afforestation was conditional on the farmer income level. In one European 
study, the authors investigated how different types of producers (i.e., hobby, part-time, full-time, or 
retired) managed land, mainly focusing on afforestation (Praestholm, Reenberg, and Kristensen 
2006). Analyzing survey results, they found that hobby and part-time farmers have a higher 
willingness to afforest than retired and full timers. Tom (2010) found that several factors negatively 
influenced afforestation rates in Kenya, including poor land use practices, lack of capital, insufficient 
land holdings, insecure land tenure, competing land uses, and labor shortages. Competing use of land 
was the predominant reason why land owners did not afforest.  
Participation in land retirement programs  
 
A number of studies have examined land diversion, land retirement, and changing land use 
practices. For example, Gasson and Potter (1988) studied British farmers’ responsiveness to 
hypothetical programs that would compensate farmers for diverting working agricultural lands to 
untilled land, forests, or permanent pasture. The study found that payments for land diversion could 
achieve economic and environmental objectives, but that voluntary programs would have little effect 
on farms with no previous experience with conservation practices. The authors estimate that three 
percent of available farmland would be converted to forest under a hypothetical cost-share program. 
One study finding is that those farmers who already had forest on their property offered more land to 
forests than those who did not.  
Using enrollment data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Plantinga, Alig, and 
Cheng (2001) estimated supply functions for grassland and forested land at different cost-share 
prices. Their results suggest that farmers in the East had a steep supply curve, i.e., a higher payment 
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was required to encourage land enrollment into forests. The Southeast was more amenable to 
converting agricultural land to forest. In the North and South Plains, grassland enrollment was the 
most popular choice, because the regional climates are not ideal for forestry. Thus, to promote 
afforestation in these regions, additional incentives would be required. Lambert, Sullivan, and 
Claassen (2007) also analyzed participation in the CRP and choice of management practices 
implemented using data from the USDA’s 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS).  The results show that farmers who earned a larger percentage of their income from 
farming enrolled more land than those who earned less of their income from farming. The study finds 
few demographic differences between CRP participants and non-participants. The authors find that 
land retirement is more appealing to retired or recreational farmers, for whom land diversion schemes 
can provide supplemental income. The results suggest that whole field retirement appeals to farmers 




The survey used a random sample of beef cattle, cow/calf, and backgrounding/stockering 
operations from the eight Economic Research Service (ERS) Regions east of the 100th meridian. The 
ERS regions are based on commodity production, geographical specialization, and other 
characteristics (USDA-ERS, 2007). The sample was drawn by USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) and was limited to operations with at least 20 head of cattle as reported by 
the 2007 Census of Agriculture to decrease the likelihood of sampling hobby farms. A copy of the 
survey is attached as Appendix A. A total of 8,875 operations were randomly chosen from the 
population of 267,413 farms. The survey sample represented three percent of the total population. 
The sampling intensity and design was based on a three percent margin of error at a 95 percent 
confidence interval. Post stratification weights were developed based on the cross tabulation of farm 
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sales classes and ERS regions (Lambert et al. 2014a). USDA/NASS sent out the survey in early 2013 
with an initial mailing, a reminder postcard (one week later), and second follow up mailing (two 
weeks later). A total of 2,448 completed surveys were returned for a 28 percent response rate.  
The survey was divided into three sections. The first section (“Your Farming Operation”) 
focused on the characteristics of the producer and the operation. The next section (“Afforestation”) 
informed respondents about what afforestation is and how it might benefit both them and the 
environment. Respondents were then asked about a hypothetical program including an incentive paid 
over a 10 year period as well as a 75 percent purchase and installation cost share to either afforest 
acres, or, for those who had already afforested pursuant to a government program, to expand the 
number of acres afforested. Five versions of the survey were administered. Each version was the 
same in all respects, except for the hypothetical incentive level offered. The annual incentive levels 
were $60, $90, $120, $150, and $180 per acre. The price points were based on a presurvey of 300 
producers. The survey versions were randomly distributed across the sample. If respondents had 
afforested land through a government program such as CRP or EQIP, they were asked about acres 
they had enrolled in the program and payment per acre received. Respondents were also asked their 
opinions about factors influencing their participation and the outcomes they anticipated from 
afforested land. The final section of the survey (“About You”) included questions designed to obtain 
information on respondent demographics and factors that might influence willingness to afforest.  
The survey collected information on respondent willingness to participate in a hypothetical 
incentive program for afforesting land via a series of three questions. The first question asked about 
respondent interest in afforestation and provided respondents with three response options: not 
interested in afforestation, interested in afforestation if it were profitable, and interested even if it was 
not profitable to afforest. Respondents who indicated they were either interested if profitable or 
interested even if not profitable were asked whether they would afforest, given the hypothetical per 
acre incentive payment. Respondents who accepted the hypothetical incentive and indicated 
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willingness to covert acreage on their farm to forest were asked how many acres they would be 
willing to enroll in the hypothetical afforestation program. A tiered modeled approach is adopted to 
accommodate this survey design, with levels of analysis: (1) willingness to afforest; (2) willingness 
to participate in the hypothetical incentive program, given willingness to afforest and the incentive 
level offered; and (3) participation intensity, or the number of acres the respondent would be willing 
to enroll in the program, given acceptance of the incentive and participation in the program. 
Producers are assumed to have two options for each acre of pasture: continue as pasture or afforest. It 
is expected that if producer prefers to convert their land to some other use, say, plant corn, he or she 
would have already done so.  
Conceptual model 
 
Interest in afforestation  
 
The conceptual model follows Jensen et al. (2015). Afforestation is hypothesized to occur 
when the producer’s utility (u) from afforesting is greater or equal to the producer’s utility from not 
afforesting. A producer afforests when 	1, ;   	0, ; , where 1 denotes adoption of 
afforestation and 0 is no adoption of afforestation; I is income; and x is a vector of operator 
characteristics and farm structure attributes affecting the decision of whether to afforest or not.  
McFadden (1974) provides the random utility model, which provides the framework for 
modeling the adoption of afforestation. The utility from afforesting () is defined as      
 where the state of afforestation is represented by j = 0,1. The coefficient of the farm structure or 
producer characteristics vector (x) is , and  is an unobservable, independent and identically 
distributed error term. In practice, the producer’s utility function is unknown because some 
components are unobserved. The incomplete function of utility can be noted by , where j represents 
the state of afforestation. As described above, afforestation is a discrete choice, and all that is 
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observable is the discrete choice decision, not the underlying latent utilities. When the latent variable 
is positive, or     , the producer is expected to adopt afforestation. 
Using the random utility model, the probability that a producer will afforest is Pr	  1 
Pr	        Pr	    , where  are the parameters to be estimated (Cooper 
1997). The probability of afforesting is Pr	  1  !"(, where !" is a cumulative distribution 
function of  (Cooper 1997). The probability that a producer will adopt afforestation is a function of 
his or her demographic variables.  
Willingness to afforest given a hypothetical incentive payment 
 
The offer of an incentive for producers to afforest could be expected to alter the producers’ 
decision making. Offering a hypothetical incentive, changes the condition for afforestation to 
	1,   #; ,   	0, ; ,  where 1 denotes participation and 0 is non-participation; P is a net 
program incentive; and I and x are as before (Jensen et al. 2015). P is a net program incentive, 
because the respondents are responsible for 25 percent of afforestation costs.   
Because utility is subjective, each respondent’s utility function is comprised of different 
components:  u	,   #; , .  Given these assumptions, producer willingness to participate in the 
program, given the net incentive P, is 	1,   #; ,     	0, ; ,    (Jensen et al. 
2015).   
As Jensen et al. (2015) show, producers adopt afforestation, when  %  % ·     % 
% · 	  #   where % is strictly positive. The probability a producer participates in the program, 
or accepts B, is extended to Pr	'(()*+  ,  Pr	        Pr	    %  % ·
,. Other covariates (x) related to respondent’s finances may influence program participation given 
an incentive level. Given incentive payment P, the probability of participating is Pr	'(()*+  , 





Producers willing to accept the incentive to participate in the program are also asked to 
indicate the extent to which they are willing to participate, or how many acres they would be willing 
to enroll. An important determinant of the acres enrolled into the program is the amount of acreage 
producers have to enroll in the program. It is assumed that any such scale effects influencing the 
program acres supply function are fixed in the short term, i.e. that a respondent’s total acreage 
directly affects the number of acres that could be enrolled into the program (Jensen et al. 2015). 
Acres enrolled into the program are only observed among the set of producers expressing a 
willingness to participate in the program, meaning the respondent answers yes to both the first and 
second hurdles.   
Forest-specific considerations  
 
Unlike other BMPs, afforestation usually requires exclusive use of land.3 Similar to 
agriculture production, afforestation has risks: the uncertainty of potential diseases, land value, and 
timber values all have an effect on willingness to afforest. As a result, many farmers may be reluctant 
to afforest even when returns from forestry are higher than those from agriculture (Wiemers and 
Behan 2004). Conversely, some producers may derive utility from forest ownership and be willing to 
afforest even when financial returns from afforestation do not exceed those from continued 
agricultural production (Schatzki 2001). As previously stated, the producer is assumed to have two 
options for each acre of pasture: continue as pasture or afforest.  
Because the benefits and costs of afforestation are dynamic, a simple net revenue equation 
becomes more complicated. Marginal benefits of conversion can include forest benefits and incentive 
payments. Forgone agriculture products, changes in land value, and added risk are included in 
marginal opportunity costs. It can be assumed that producers make land-use decisions in order to 
                                                          
3
 However, there are several studies that analyze multiple land use policies, such as joint livestock and timber 
production (e.g. Riiters, Brodie, and Hann 1982; Watson 2000) 
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maximize net present value (Schatzki 2001). Absent an incentive program, an owner of pasture land 
would strive to maximize economic returns to the land by maximizing the present value of net 
benefits (PVNP) for pasture land (Parks 1993):  
(1)               PVNP= max - .π	01, *1;  2  31!1  45	!1,  *1;  26)7819+:   s.t. ;1  01  !1 
where 2 describes producer characteristics that influence profitability (e.g. extension workshops, 
farm size, income, etc), 01 is acres in pasture at time t, !1 is acres in forest at time t,  31 is the per-
acre cost of converting land to forestry, and input and output prices are represented by *1. Equation 1 
is subject to a land constraint. While it is possible for producers to buy or lease more land, land 
availability is restricted.  
In addition to the hypothetical incentive payments for converting land to forests, expected 
future timber harvest profits are also considered by the producer. After the ten year contract is over, 
the producer faces another land-use decision. He or she can renew the afforestation contract 
(assuming one is available), convert land back to agriculture, or leave the land in forest (no contract). 
It can be assumed that some producers consider afforestation to be a permanent or irreversible land-
use change. According to Parks (1993) land irreversibility is determined by “1) the marginal 
agricultural lands are insufficiently productive to ever justify payment for land-clearing costs after 
being converted to forests, 2) post-conversion forest benefits permanently exceed agricultural 
opportunity costs or 3) conversion to forests under a land policy is required to be permanent.”  
Perhaps as a result of increased commodity prices, some producers may choose to return to 
agriculture production on forested acres. Assuming that ten years is not enough time for optimal 
harvest, participants may want to leave their land in trees to harvest in the future, or maybe they find 
utility in the afforested acres. Schatzki (2003) suggests that producers will opt for land uses that have 
greater flexibility and lower start-up costs. To promote conversion of grazing land to forests, these 
potential barriers should be considered in the implementation of program policy.  
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Parks (1993) observes that producers do not think statically; rather, they consider “capital 
gains” when making decisions in the long term. Assuming prices are known and discount rates are 
constant, a model of producer decision making, taking future land-use decisions into account, could 
take into consideration the following formation of net present value:  
(2)                            PV=- 4	01, *1;  2)781  - 5  !)781  35!  <=>)781  :  
Where, 4 is the discounted stream of profits from pasture. The annual per-acre incentive payments 
are represented by 5 . 35 is the same as above. The variable <=> represents the value of the afforested 
land, discounted, after the expiration of the contract, i.e., ten-years:  
(3)                             <=>=Max ?@p > q – D5E!  - 4	01, *1;  2)781:- 45: 	!1 , *1;  2)781 F   
Equation three represents the maximum of two different possible values – the value of the 
afforested land if the timber was harvested and the land was converted back to pasture or the value of 
the land if left in timber production. Price (p) could be that of board feet and q as the quantity. The 
per acre cost of harvesting is represented by D5. Assuming land would be converted back to 
agriculture after timber harvest, agriculture profits are also considered.  
Empirical model and estimation 
 
Acreage enrolled in the hypothetical afforestation program is modeled beginning with 
willingness to afforest (interest), willingness to participate in the hypothetical program given the cost 
share and annual payment offered (accept), and the number of acres the respondent is willing to 
enroll in the program (logacres) given acceptance of the hypothetical offer. This triple hurdle model 
is modeled using a conditional mixed process model (Roodman 2011). As adopted from Jensen et al. 
(2015), a triple hurdle regression (equations 4-10) models the afforestation adoption decision 




(4)           GH+)I)J+K>   LK  K 
                                                   GH+)I)J+K  M1 , GH+)I)J+K> N 00, GH+)I)J+K>  0 O 
 
(5)                              '(()*+K>  % LK  K 
      '(()*+K  M1 , '(()*+K> N 0| GH+)I)J+K> N 00, '(()*+K>  0| GH+)I)J+K> N 0 O 
 
(6) QRS'(I)J  T LUK  )K 
QRS'(I)JK  MQRS'(I)J ,    '(()*+K> N 0                 ,         '(()*+K>  0 O 
 
In the first hurdle (equation 4), producers were asked if they would be interested in 
afforesting. Respondents expressing interest (interest=1) moved then to the second hurdle (equation 
5). In this hurdle, producers were offered an upfront cost share and per acre annual payment. 
Producers either refused ('(()*+ = 0) or accepted the offer ('(()*+ = 1). If accept=1, producers 
were asked to supply an acreage amount given their willingness to afforest and participate in the 
incentive program (i.e., GH+)I)J+  1 and '(()*+ = 1).  
The triple hurdle model listed above is recursive (equations 4-6), so it can be assumed that 
the error terms are correlated and assumed to be multivariate normally distributed each with an 
expected value of zero (Jensen et al. 2015):  
 
(7)    ?KK)K F ~Z<[ \?
000F , ]




Based on these assumptions, the parameter vectors (β, γ, η) and the covariance matrix in (equation 7) 
can be jointly estimated using full information maximum likelihood. Jensen et al. (2015) provide a 
log likelihood function for the model: 
 
(8)       
ln ; 
∑ ln@Φ	 LKE  ∑ ln@Φ	 LK, % LK, ^EKe1f8fg1hiifj1k>lKe1f8fg1l 
                           ∑ ln@D	QRS'(I)JK| LK, % LK, T LUK, ^, ^U, ^U, _Eiifj1k>hKe1f8fg1k>h . 
Marginal effects 
 
Calculating the marginal effects for this triple hurdle model is not straightforward, and it is 
important to note that independent variables included in superior tiers indirectly influence the 
marginal effects of dependent variables in lower tiers even if those variables are not in the equation 
(Jensen et al. 2015).  Using the conditional and unconditional means formulations of acres enrolled 
into the program, marginal effects can be derived. The unconditional expected mean acres enrolled 
are calculated as (for example, Yen and Rosinski 2008); 
(9)                        m	QRS'(I)JK  nT LUK  op q · Φ	 LK  _^U, % LK  _^U, ^. 
The conditional mean of acres enrolled into the program is calculated as:  
(10)           m	QRS'(I)JK|QRS'(I)JK N 0, '(()*+  1  nT LUK  op q · rp	s tukvowux,y tpkvowpx,wuprp	s tuk,y tpk,wup . 
The marginal effects equations 9 and 10 are estimated using a finite difference approximation 
algorithm suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and applied by Jensen et al. (2015), where the 
variable’s marginal effect is equal to the mean difference between the unconditional and conditional 
means. For the binary decisions, willingness to afforest (interest) and willingness to participate 
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(accept), the marginal effects are derived from the numerator and denominator of the bivariate 
cumulative density ratio in the conditional mean expression. 
Factor analysis 
The survey included a question on the importance of a number of different factors on the 
respondent’s decision to participate in the afforestation program (figure 1 in appendix B) and a 
question on the likelihood of various effects of participation in the afforestation program on the 
respondent’s operation (figure 2 in appendix B). Responses to these questions were included as 
explanatory variables in the model through factor analysis.  
Factor analysis simplifies the dimensionality of multiple variables, collapsing variable sets 
into a few common factors using a loading score. Factor analysis is useful when working with several 
variables that are expected to be positively correlated with one another, and is used to determine the 
relationship between the questions and the latent traits that are displayed through respondent answers 
(Thurstone 1931).   
Answers to the questions included in the factor analysis are relevant to the motivations of a 
respondent participating in the afforestation program.  Using a factor analysis on the two questions 
eliminates the possibility of having collinear variables. The factor analysis was performed using the 
factor command in Stata. 
Common factor analysis produces orthogonal factors by estimating a common variance 
among the original variables. When determining factors, a common rule is any factor with an 
eigenvalue exceeding one should be included in the analysis (Thurstone 1931). Prior to rotation, 
factor loadings may not sort well, which is indicated when the large eigenvalue values for the first 
factor for the importance and the likelihood question, 5.89 and 4.50, respectively (tables 1 and 2 in 
appendix B). Factor loadings may be clearly differentiated after rotation (Comrey and Lee 2013). 
After rotation, the eigenvalues for the importance question changed to 3.62 (first factor) and 2.53 
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(second factor) for the importance question and 2.57 (first factor) and 2.24 (second factor) for the 
likelihood question. No other factors for either question had eigenvalues greater than one. Rotation of 
the factor loadings was performed using Stata’s rotate command (StataCorp 2013) 
Factor loadings range from negative one to positive one, and represent the correlation 
between the variable and factors. Based on Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics, any loading with a 
score above 0.6 should be considered in an analysis (Kaiser 1974). Fabrigar et al. (1998) also argues 
for a 0.6 minimum. Nonetheless, factor loading should be considered in terms common sense and not 
solely defined by a cutoff level. As explained below, the factor analysis results produced factors 
loadings which met the recommended 0.6 minimum and made intuitive sense.  
 The importance question asked respondents to rank each characteristic’s importance from 
“not at all important” to “extremely important” on their decision to participate in the program. The 
question listed ten items, and the factor analysis created two main factors, which are labeled as 
“private costs” (privcosts) and “social benefits” (socialben) (table 1 in appendix B). “Private costs” 
include time and labor requirements, investment cost of converting land to forest, amount of 
paperwork required, limitations on end uses of timber harvested, and per acre program payment 
offered for converting land to forest. “Social benefits” include those characteristics that do not 
exclusively benefit the respondent: carbon offset potential, knowledge about afforestation practices, 
and the impact of afforestation on the environment.  
 For the afforestation impacts question, respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of 
various impacts of program participation on their operation on a five point scale ranging from 
“highly unlikely” to “highly likely.” Two common factors stood out. They are labeled 
“environmental benefits” (environmental) and “production benefits” (production) (Table 2 in 
appendix B). Reducing the amount of soil erosion, improving water quality, improving farm 
appearance, and improving wildlife habitat are associated with the environmental factor. Belief that 
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program participation was likely to increase farm profitability, free up land for other agricultural 
uses, and improve forage production correlate with the production factor.  
Hypothesized effects of explanatory variables  
 
A list of explanatory variables and hypothesized effects are found in table 4 in appendix B. 
Respondents were faced with three decisions in this survey. The first was whether the respondent 
was interested in afforesting or expanding afforestation (interest). Respondents who were interested 
were then asked if they would adopt or expand afforestation given a hypothetical incentive payment 
(accept). Several non-monetary variables included in the first hurdle were excluded in the second 
hurdle, because the accept decision is based on a payment level. Because the incentive payment 
(incentive) is introduced in the second hurdle, it is logical that only variables directly affecting a 
respondent’s financial circumstance are included. The introduction of the incentive payment reflects 
a change in the context of the decision from a general set of factors of afforestation interest to factors 
directly relating to the profitability of afforestation. While, the variables’ effects on these two 
decisions are expected to be similar, the significance levels are expected to differ. For example, if 
age is hypothesized to be negative in the interest level, there would be no reason to believe that age 
would change signs in the accept decision.  
The third choice question asked for the number of acres the respondent would be willing to 
afforest in exchange for the incentive payment (logacres). The variables included in the interest and 
accept decisions are mainly farm and operator characteristics. The decision of logacres is assumed to 
be directly influenced by incentive level, respondent total farmed acres, and each county’s 
geographic coordinates. Because the logacres decision is a function of interest and accept, including 
all of the variables included in those hurdles in unnecessary. However, several variables are thought 
to influence the amount of acres respondents are willing to afforest and, thus, are included in the 
logacres regression: incentive, acrfarm, latitude and longitude. The county centroid coordinates 
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(latitude, longitude) are included because they are purely exogenous and can be a proxy for climate, 
vegetative cover, and rainfall.  
Socio-demographic attributes 
 
  Duesburg et al (2014), Frawley and Leavy (2001), and Ni Dhubhain and Gardiner (1994) 
find that respondents with larger farms are more willing to adopt afforestation. This finding makes 
intuitive sense, because respondents with larger operations usually have more resources to adopt 
technology and conservation practices. However, Basarir (2002) and Gillespie et al (2007) did not 
find adoption rates of BMPs to be affected by farm size. For this study, operators of larger farms 
(acrfarm) are expected to be more likely to express an interest in afforestation and acceptance of the 
payment. It is expected that respondents who already own woodland (ownwood) will be more likely 
to afforest. The presence of forests can be an indicator that an operator’s land quality, land slope, and 
climate are suited for forests. In addition, if a respondent has previously afforested (prevafforest), it 
is expected that he or she is more likely to afforest in the future. For example, Duesberg et al (2014) 
found that farmers who had previously planted trees were 12 percent more likely to afforest in the 
future.  
Schirmer and Bull (2014) found that age was inversely related with willingness to afforest 
and/or reforest. Duesburg et al (2014) found that those operators between the ages of 45-64 were 
more likely to afforest compared with older respondents. In a literature review of BMP adoption, 
Prokopy et al (2008) found that that age is negatively correlated with adoption rates. It is 
hypothesized that age (age) will be negatively correlated with interest and accept.  
Afforestation is a long term investment. If the respondent plans for his or her family to take 
over the farm operations (famtkovr), the respondent may be more likely to afforest (Kim, Gillespie, 
and Paudel 2008). This variable is hypothesized to positively influence interest and accept. Because 
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afforestation is tied to the land, it makes sense that the future of the farm should be taken into 
consideration.  
In an analysis of Irish forest owners, Howley (2013) found that having an off-farm job had a 
positive effect on a producer’s likelihood of planting trees. If a producer has an off farm job, he or 
she might be more inclined to choose a land use with a limited time demand, such as forest. 
Similarly, Duesburg et al (2014) found that full-time farmers were less likely to afforest. Thus, the 
dummy variable identifying those who worked off the farm (offfarmwork) is expected to be 
positively correlated with interest and accept. 
Respondent total household income (income), on and off farm, is expected to positively 
correlate with interest and accept. Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2008) found that cattle producers with 
higher incomes were more likely to adopt BMPs. Similarly, Gillespie et al (2007) found the percent 
of income from cattle and beef operations to be positively correlated with BMP adoption rates. Thus, 
the percent of income from cattle and beef operations (cowpercent) is hypothesized to be positively 
correlated with interest and accept. It is hypothesized that respondents who did not graduate from 
college will be less likely to afforest than those who attended or graduated from college (socol and 
college). Respondents with more education are probably more likely to be aware of possible 
conservation and environmental efforts.  
Lastly, the incentive level (incentive) is expected to have a positive influence on accept and 
logacres. As the incentive level increases so does the return to afforestation. A significant and 
positive coefficient on logacres indicates that those producers who are offered a higher incentive 
payment are willing to enroll more acres in the afforestation program.  
Regional characteristics  
 
In addition to farm and producer characteristics, several variables representing characteristics 
of the area in which the operator is located were included. The county centroid for each respondent 
27 
 
was represented latitude and longitude coordinates. Geographic coordinates are straightforward and 
can be easier to interpret than regional variables, such as the Farm Resource Regions produced by 
USDA’s Economic Research Service in which  regions are delineated on the basis of production, 
temperature, rainfall, etc.  Latitude lines are the “y” coordinate on a map (latitude) with higher 
latitudes in the north and lower in the south. Longitude lines are the “x” coordinate (longitude), 
which begin at zero on the prime meridian in Europe and are positive to the east and negative to the 
west. In the U.S., longitude decreases from east to west. It is hypothesized that both latitude (latitude) 
and longitude (longitude) will be negatively correlated with willingness to afforest. As Plantinga, 
Alig, and Cheng (2001) find, conservation costs are highest in Appalachia, the Delta States, the 
Northeast, and the Southeast relative to other regions. The areas that are more “cost effective” are the 
Northern Plains, Great Lake States, the Corn Belt, and the Southern Plains. Nonetheless, the change 
in county population density from the 2000 to the 2010 census (changeindensity) is expected to be 
negatively correlated with willingness to afforest. Increasing population density implies higher land 
values and greater opportunity costs to afforestation. Increases in population density may be 
associated with increases in development pressure and decreases in the likelihood that forest will be 
the most profitable or desirable land cover. Producers in regions with increasing population density 
might be reluctant to enroll in a ten year contract because of uncertainties about future land values. A 
chart of the adoption decision process is shown in figure 3 in appendix B. 
Results  
 
There are several sets of results presented in this chapter. First, each hurdle of the adoption 
process is estimated individually. The first two decisions, interest and accept, are modeled using 
probit regressions. The third adoption decision, logacres, is a continuous variable. However, because 
each adoption decision affects the subsequent decision, modeling each decision separately does not 
account for the sample selection that occurs as respondents navigate the hurdles. Thus, these results 
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are not of primary interest. However, the results of the single equations are provided in tables 5-7 of 
appendix B for reference and comparison with the main results of the system of equations. 
Of more interest are the results from the triple hurdle model. The triple hurdle model is 
significant overall. The rejection of the null hypothesis, that beta is equal to zero, demonstrates that 
the covariates are jointly significant in explaining the three afforestation decisions. The correlation 
between the error terms (^, ^U, ^U) of each adoption decision are significant (table 8 of appendix 
B).  
Respondents answered questions regarding a hypothetical cost-share afforestation program. 
The program promised to match 75 percent of the planting costs and provide an annual payment for 
10 years. Of the respondents who answered the interest question (hurdle 1), 314 (29 percent) were 
interested in afforestation. Out of those respondents, 179 indicated they would be willing to afforest. 
These respondents who said yes to the second hurdle were willing to enroll an average of 73 acres in 
the hypothetical afforestation program.  
Interest in Afforestation 
 
There are 19 variables included in the interest regression, eight of which are significant at the 
10% level (table 8, appendix B). The percent of respondent’s farm income from cattle production 
(cowpercent) has a positive effect on interest; the more cattle revenue a producer brings in compared 
to his or her overall farm income, the more likely he or she is to be interested in afforestation. This 
result might seem counterintuitive. One might expect that a greater percent of revenue from cattle 
would be associated with a lower interest in planting trees on potentially profitable grazing land. In 
addition, cowpercent could be a proxy for the prioritization of cattle on a respondent’s farm. 
However, the positive coefficient could reflect a desire among producers to diversify their farming 
operations. Compared with those who attended or graduated high school (i.e., highsch used a base 
case in model), respondents who graduated from college (college) are more likely to be interested in 
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afforesting. Thus, respondents who only attended high school are less likely to be interested.  As 
hypothesized, age was found to have a negative effect on interest. Older producers are less likely to 
be interest in planting trees than younger ones.  
The variables prevafforest and ownwood are also positively correlated with interest. Those 
respondents who have previously afforested or are currently afforesting (prevafforest) or who own 
woodland (ownwood) are more likely to be interested in afforestation. The prevafforest variable 
reflects purposeful action by the respondent (i.e., planting trees), while the ownwood variable merely 
reflects passive ownership. Nonetheless, both variables proxy what type of land a respondent owns 
and both could reflect owner preferences for woodland.  
Four factor variables were included in the interest hurdle (socialben, privcosts, 
environmental, production). These variables were positive and significant. Socialben, environmental, 
and production were expected to be positively associated with willingness to afforest, because they 
involved questions regarding afforestation benefits.  Although expected to be positive, privcosts 
involved questions regarding possible land use drawbacks. If the respondent believes that time and 
labor are a concern then he or she would be more willing to afforest. Relative to other agricultural 
land uses, afforestation may be less time consuming. Thus, this significant positive relationship is 
logical.  
Finally, farm size (acrfarm), household income (income), off-farm employment 
(offfarmwork) and the regional variables (latitude, longitude) were not significant in the interest 
regression.  
Willingness to afforest and hypothetical incentive payments 
 
 Out of the 314 respondents expressing interest in afforestation (and, thus, moving from the 
first to the second hurdle), 179 replied they would adopt afforestation given a hypothetical incentive 
payment. Figure 4 in appendix B shows the number of producers who were willing to afforest at each 
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incentive level along with the cumulative total at each level. Surprisingly, as the incentive payment 
gets larger, fewer producers are willing to commit to afforest.  
The model of the adoption decision (accept) includes explanatory variables related to the 
respondent’s monetary or fiscal characteristics. Three of the eight variables are significant at the 10% 
level. Age is significant in this decision; it is positively associated with willingness to afforest. Age 
switches sign in the second hurdle (relative to the first hurdle), once the incentive payment is offered, 
which possibly indicates that among those producers who are interested in afforesting, older 
producers are more influenced by monetary incentives than younger producers.  
The incentive level (incentive) is positive and significant at the 10% level. The higher the 
incentive payment, the more likely a respondent will accept the incentive and afforest. As 
hypothesized, total acres farmed (acrfarm) is also positive and significant. The results indicate that 
farmers with more land are more likely to enroll in the afforestation program. Unlike in the interest 
decision, the percent of income from cattle production (cowpercent) and income (income) were not 
found to be significantly different from zero.  
Acreage conversion 
 
The 179 respondents who said yes to both of the first two afforestation questions (interest, 
accept) were then asked to state the number of acres they would be willing to afforest. The average 
number of acres provided by the respondents is 73 (figure 5, appendix B). Interestingly enough, the 
average number of acres respondents were willing to commit to the program decreased as the amount 
of the incentive payment increased. Compared to respondents at the $180 incentive, the average 
amount of acres offered at the $60 incentive was three times as much.  
Of the four variables included in the supply of acres decision, two are significant at the 10% 
level. Contrary to expectations, the coordinates (latitude, longitude) are negative and significant. 
Regional characteristics have a large effect on adoption decisions. Respondents who are willing to 
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participate in the afforestation program and who live in southern latitudes are willing to convert more 
acres into forests than participants who live in more northern latitudes. As Plantinga, Alig, and 
Cheng (2001) note, forestry is a “viable alternative” to farming in the Southeast, which is consistent 
with our results. Similarly, respondents who live further west are more likely to convert land to 
forests than eastern producers. Farm size (acrfarm) and the incentive level (incentive) are not 
significant at the 10% level in this hurdle. Thus, the results suggest that the amount of the incentive 
payment significantly influences a respondent’s willingness to afforest but not the intensity or extent 
to which the respondent is willing to afforest (number of acres). This result suggests that people who 
enroll acres in the afforestation program may be more influenced by the non-pecuniary benefits 
forests can provide such as, wildlife habitat, water quality improvement, timber production, and 
aesthetics.  
 The conditional mean number of pasture acres enrolled in the hypothetical program was 
62.14, compared to the unconditional mean of 20.43. The conditional mean reflects acreage 
conversion among those respondents who expressed interest in afforestation. The unconditional mean 
is an estimation of afforestation acreage conversion among all 304 respondents. 
As the incentive level (incentive) increases by one dollar, respondents enroll 0.18 less acres 
(table 8, appendix B). Respondents who previously afforested (prevafforest) are willing to enroll 
17.49 more acres than those who have not previously afforested in the program. Operators owning 
woodland (ownwood) are willing to enroll 6.65 more acres than those who did not. Respondents with 
a college degree (college) were willing to enroll 8.49 more acres than respondents who only attended 
high school. For every one percent increase percent of income from cattle (cowincome), respondents 
convert 0.007 less acres. For every one acre increase in total acres farmed (acrfarm), respondents 
enroll 0.03 more acres. For every one degree increase in latitude, respondents enroll 7.01 fewer acres. 
Similarly, for every one degree increase in longitude, respondents enroll 2.03 fewer acres. 





This analysis provides useful insights into cattle producer interest in and willingness to 
afforest grazing lands. The results suggest a moderate level of interest in afforestation with 31 
percent of respondents expressing interest in afforestation. Several factors significantly influence a 
respondent’s interest, including having a college degree, owning woodland, having previously 
afforested, being younger, and earning a greater percentage of farming income from cattle. 
 Respondents who expressed interest in afforestation were asked, hypothetically, if they 
would afforest if given an incentive payment to do so. Of the respondents who expressed interested 
in afforestation, 56 percent stated that they were willing to afforest given the incentive payment.  
Willingness to afforest was positively influenced by the level of the incentive payment, and producer 
age and total acres farmed. Not surprisingly, producers were more willing to afforest and accept the 
hypothetical payment if the payment was larger. While older producers were less likely to be 
interested in afforestation, they were more likely to be willing to accept the incentive and afforest, if 
interested.  These results may suggest that, when it comes to afforesting pasture, older producers are 
more financially motivated than their younger counterparts.  
Producers who were willing to afforest were asked to provide an acreage amount for 
conversion. Acreage intensity was only affected by two geographic variables – latitude and 
longitude. The number of acres a producer who was willing to afforest was greater in southern 
latitudes than in northern latitudes. Similarly, producers who live in more western states are willing 
to enroll more acres than those who live in the east. Respondents who are willing to afforest acres do 
not appear to be particularly responsive to the incentive payment, as the incentive level had little 
influence on the number of acres producers were willing to enroll in the hypothetical program. One 
possible explanation is that the incentive payment and acres afforested is something similar to a 
backward bending labor supply curve. In this example, it means that producers are making enough 
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income, either on and/or off farm, to work less and consume more leisure. This idea is highlighted by 
figure 5 in the appendix B. At the 60 dollar incentive payment, the average amount of acres provided 
was almost three times greater than the 180 dollar incentive. Further research could be done on how 
incentive payments affect acreage conversions in order to better understand this relationship.  
One use for the results generated by this paper is to attempt to predict actual enrollment rates 
and associated levels of carbon sequestration. What follows is a back-of-the-envelope stab at such 
predictions, ignoring what are undoubtedly a large number of complications that should cause one to 
take these predictions with a rather large grain of salt. That said, afforestation hypothetical 
enrollment predictions and estimated carbon sequestration rates can be found in table 9 in appendix 
B. The projected addition afforestation acres were estimated from the econometric model, based on 
the conditional acreage enrollment. From across all ERS regions the total projected acres is 2.4 
million, with the majority being in the Eastern Upland and Southern Seaboard. As stated previously, 
afforestation has the potential to sequester large amounts of carbon (Lewandrowski et al 2004; 
Birdsey 1996; Feng et al 2006). Using Birdsey’s (1996) estimates of 1.39 Mt/acre, projected carbon 
sequestration rates under the hypothetical program were estimated (table 9).  The potential total 
amount of carbon sequestration was found to be 3.39 million Mt.  
Future researchers could focus on why a respondent would want to afforest. For example, a 
respondent could be interested in afforesting, because he or she is ready to retire from farming, while 
another respondent could be interested in afforestation, because he or she has marginal land that is 
not productive for grazing cattle. Similarly, agroforestry or joint cattle and woodland operation could 
be of interest to respondents. Agroforestry can provide many benefits to a cattle operation such as 
shade, wind protection, and erosion reduction. Further research should try to capture these 
motivations, in order to better understand cattle producers’ views of forests, because knowing these 
motivations would help policy makers design and implement effective programs to increase 
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Table 1: Factor Analysis of Importance of Items on Program Participation  
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor Description 
Socio-demographic/environmental questions   
Amount of time required  0.7886 0.2496  
“Private Costs” 
(privcosts) 
Investment cost 0.8442 0.3135 
Amount of paperwork 0.7647 0.3272 
Per acre payment offered     0.6680 0.5007 
Limitations on end uses of timber 0.6176 0.4739 
    
Offset carbon emissions 0.3040 0.7268 “Social Benefits” 
(socialben) Level of knowledge about afforestation 0.5291 0.6021 
Impact of afforestation on the environment  0.4092 0.7384 
    
Availability of Extension services  0.5325 0.4949  




Table 2: Factor Analysis of Likelihood Impacts from Program Participation 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor Description  
Socio-demographic/environmental questions  
Reduce soil erosion on farm 0.7987 0.3587 “Environmental 
Benefits”  
(environmental) 
Improve water qualitsy on farm 0.8039 0.317 
Improve farm appearance 0.6055 0.5035 
Improve wildlife habitat  0.5941 0.2664 
    
Free up land for other ag. uses 0.3368 0.7462 “ProductionBenefits” 
(production) Improve forage 0.3546 0.7808 
    
Increase feed costs  0.3057 0.4482  
Increase profitability 0.4926 0.5671 










Table 3: Variables and descriptive statistics included in the triple hurdle model 
Name Variable Description Mean N Minimum Maximum 
DEPENDANT VARIABLES     
interest  1 if respondent interested in 
afforestation, 0 otherwise  
0.30 1010 0 1 
accept 1 if respondent would afforest given 
incentive level offered, 0 otherwise  
0.57 304 0 1 
logacres Acres would afforest given incentive 
level  
3.43 171 0 7.83 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
incentive Annual per acre incentive payment 
offered ($60, $90, $120, $150, $180) 
121.97 304 60 180 
acrfarm Total acres farmed  491.39 1010 2 20999 
age Age of respondent  61.73 1010 24 95 
income (a) Total household income of respondent  4.01 1010 1 8 
highsch 
(omitted) 
1 if respondent only attended or 
graduated high school, 0 otherwise 
0.36 1010 0 1 
socol 1 if respondent attended college, 0 
otherwise 
0.25 1010 0 1 
college  1 if respondent graduated college, 0 
otherwise 
 1010 0 1 
latitude Latitude coordinate 36.90 1010 26.39 48.86 
logitude Longitude coordinate -90.53 1010 -99.99 -68.09 
prevafforest 1 if has previously afforested, 0 
otherwise 
0.08 1010 0 1 
stockdensity Stocking Rate= (.92*cows+ .08* calves+ 
1.35*bulls+ .6*backgrounder calves+ 
.6*stocker calves+.92*dairy cows+ 
.8*replacement heifers 
+.8*miscellaneous cattle)/ total number 
of pasture acres farmed (Holt 2013) 
0.64 1010 0 27.83 
famtkovr 1 if respondent’s family will take over 
farm, 0 otherwise 
0.66 1010 0 1 
cowpercent Percent of farm income from cattle  37.20% 1010 -10% 100% 
offfarmwork 1 if repondent works off farm, 0 
otherwise 
0.52 1010 0 1 
privcosts Factor analysis score 0.07 1010 -2.01 1.78 
socialben Factor analysis score 0.02 1010 -2.26 2.16 
environmental Factor analysis score 0.07 1010 -1.56 2.30 
production Factor analysis score -0.02 1010 -1.76 2.44 
Changeinden-
sity 
% change in county population density 





a Likert scale: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – $49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 




Table 4: Variables included in the triple hurdle model, along with hypothesized 
effects at each level  
  Hypothesized Effects 
Name Variable Description Interest 
 
Accept logacres 
incentive Annual per acre incentive 
payment offered ($60, $90, 
$120, $150, $180) 
 + + 
acrfarm Total acres farmed  + + + 
age Age of respondent  - -  
income Total household income of 
respondent  
+ +  
highsch 1 if respondent attended or 
graduated high school, 0 
otherwise 
omitted 
socol 1 if respondent attended 
college, 0 otherwise 
+   
college 1 if respondent graduated from 
college, 0 otherwise 
+   
latitude Latitude coordinate - - - 
logitude Longitude coordinate - - - 
prevafforest 1 if has previously afforested, 0 
otherwise 
+   
stockdensity *see footnote in table 3 +   
famtkovr 1 if respondent’s family will 
take over farm, 0 otherwise 
+   
cowpercent Percent of farm income from 
cattle  
+ +  
offfarmwork 1 if farmer works off farm, 0 
otherwise 
+ +  
privcosts Factor Analysis score +   
socialben Factor Analysis score +   
environmental Factor Analysis score +   
productionprof Factor Analysis score +   
changeindensity % change in county population 
density from the 2000 and 2010 
censuses  























Table 5: Results of Probit Regression of Respondent Interest in 
Afforestation (first hurdle) 
Variable  Est Coef. Std. Err. z  
acrfarm(x100) 0.0030 0.0002            0.25  
cowpercent 0.0040 0.0014   2.93 *** 
age -0.0063 0.0044          -1.44  
income 0.0321 0.0368            0.87  
socialben 0.3450 0.0616     5.81 *** 
privcosts 0.3881 0.0642      6.04 *** 
environmental 0.2614 0.0583      4.43 *** 
production 0.0903 0.0573            1.61  
latitude -0.0158 0.0111           -0.59  
longitude 0.0034 0.0084            0.41  
changeindensity 0.0001 0.0000            1.73 ** 
stockdensity 0.0305 0.3545 1.99  
prevafforest 0.6957 0.1587      4.38 *** 
ownwood 0.2941 0.1032      2.85 *** 
famtkovr 0.1357 0.0996            1.36  
college 0.2884 0.1121 2.57 *** 
socol 0.2034 0.1224          1.66 * 
offfarmwork 0.1729 0.1011            1.71 * 
intercept  -0.301 0.9671           -0.31  
N= 1010     LLR Test Wald χ(18)= 252.52***     McFadden's 
R2=0.2044 
 
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***)  



















































Table 6: Results of Probit Regression of Respondent Adoption Given a 
Hypothetical Incentive Payment (second hurdle)  
Variable  Est Coef. Std. Err. z  
acrfarm (x100) 0.0200 0.0010           1.68 * 
cowpercent 0.0010 0.0020 0.04  
incentive 0.0031 0.0017     1.77 * 
age 0.0043 0.0066 0.65  
latitude          -0.0127 0.0177           -0.72  
longitude 0.0226 0.0116     2.50 ** 
income          -0.0813 0.0562           -1.45  
offfarmwork 0.2083  0.612 1.29  
intercept 2.7589  1.4089 1.96 ** 
N= 314    LLR Test Wald | (8)= 14.94     McFadden’s R2=0.0348 
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***) 
Model fit: Wald Test reject }:   0 
Table 7: Results of OLS regression of Respondent Acreage Conversion (third 
hurdle) 
logacres Est. Coef. Std. Err. t  
Acrfarm (x100)    0.0010 0.0010   2.30 ** 
incentive              -0.0015 0.0020 -0.71  
latitude   -0.0949 0.0199      -4.75 *** 
longitude   -0.0288 0.0127     -2.25 ** 
intercept   4.4711 1.4489       3.09 ** 
N= 179    F test (4, 174)= 9.22***    McFadden’s R2=.1559 
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***) 











Table 8: Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects for Triple Hurdle 
Regression  
 Estimates Marginal Effects 
 logacres accept interest logacres accept interest 
incentive   -0.0001  0.0030**       -- -0.1804 0.0016 -- 
acrfarm (x100)   0.0056  0.0030**  0.0020  0.0280  0.0001  0.0018 
latitude -0.0914*** -0.0081 -0.0089 -7.0060 -0.0256 -0.032 
longitude -0.0517**  0.0225  0.0037 -2.0318  0.0105  0.0012 
income -- -0.0589  0.0181 -3.8668 -0.0160  0.0065 
age --  0.0105** -0.0090*  0.6213  0.0027 -0.0032 
college -- --  0.3047***  8.4989 --  0.1093 
socol -- --  0.1759  4.8796 --  0.0622 
offfarmwork --  0.1457  0.1029  7.7757  0.0387  0.0370 
cowpercent -- -0.0004  0.0031** -0.0056 -0.0012  0.1353 
ownwood -- --  0.2388**  6.6570 --  0.0858 
famtkovr -- --  0.0599  1.5688 --  0.0200 
prevafforest -- --  0.6103*** 17.4507 --  0.2166 
socialben -- --  0.3016***   1.4024 --  0.1264 
privcosts -- --  0.3441***   2.3419 --  0.1134 
environmental -- --  0.3158***   2.1366 --  0.1134 
production -- --  0.1259*   0.9681 --  0.0412 
stockdensity -- --  0.1219   0.3169   0.0043 
changeindensity  -- --  0.0001   0.0005 -- 0.0001 
constant   2.9481  2.2249 -0.1537    
N  179 314  1010    
Percent Correctly Classified  54.18% 55.63%    
Wald test against intercept only (4 df) 21.35***    
Log pseudolikelihood -104803.98   _  1.5952**      ^ -0.8299**     
 
 
^U   0.4685*      ^U  -0.8369**      
Significant at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**) and 1% level (***) 
Model fit: Wald Test reject }:   0 
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Metric tons carbon Acre7Year7 	1000s Standard Error 
Heartland 
344.53 22.45 485.78 25.24 
Northern Crescent 60.18 4.93 84.85 5.21 
Northern Great 
Plains 
75.63 11.93 106.64 11.97 
Prairie Gateway 827.65 197.57 1166.99 198.87 
Eastern Upland 440.80 36.03 621.54 40.52 
Southern Seaboard 419.06 32.86 590.87 33.68 
Fruitful Rim 104.34 11.60 147.12 13.64 
Mississippi portal 132.57 11.19 186.93 10.10 





















Figure 1: Importance Factor Analysis Question  
  
Figure 2: Likelihood Factor Analysis Question 
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The use of pasture management practices can provide many benefits for cattle producers 
including increased forage and production capacity, reduced soil erosion, and better pasture and 
water quality. Despite these benefits, many cattle producers do not implement pasture management 
practices.  
This study analyzed the results of a mail survey of over 4,000 cattle producers east of the 
100th meridian to determine the factors that influence the usage of ten pasture management practices. 
The ten pasture management practices were grouped into three classifications on the basis of factor 
analysis results and multivariate probit model was used to analyze producer use of one or more 
practice from each group. The dummy variable representing extension workshop attendance was 
significant (p<0.10) and positive in every equation. Other positive significant variables were 
woodland acres owned, income, and education. Age was found to have a negative effect in all cases. 
Education through extension efforts is associated with the use of pasture management practices. If 
policy makers want to increase the use of these practices, targeting producers who attend extension 
















The use of pasture management practices has many benefits including reduced soil erosion, 
increased biodiversity and vegetative cover, and reduced degradation. Pasture management practices 
can also reduce the cost of production and maintain soil fertility. For example, sediment is the largest 
surface water pollutant in the United States (EPA 2014). Exposing bare soil to rainfall oftentimes 
results in a large nutrient loss which can reduce future profits as the soil becomes less productive 
over time. The use of pasture management practices can help alleviate sediment loss. These practices 
are also important in helping manage imbalances of soil quality on pastureland. Practices such as soil 
testing, fertilizer use, manure application, and replanting pasture can restore soil nutrients. In 
addition, use of conservation practices can coincide with a successful and profitable farm by 
lowering costs and increasing overall animal health (Lemus 2008).  
Cattle producers have traditionally relied on ponds, streams, or rivers to water cattle. 
However, providing cattle direct access to waterways can damage water banks, increase sediment 
loading, increase invasive species growth, and spread water-borne diseases.  Research has shown that 
by providing an alternative water source, stream bank erosion and fecal bacteria entering streams can 
be reduced. For example, Edwards et al. (2007) found that controlling stream access and using 
nutrient management on pasture land significantly increased aquatic health.  Despite the 
implementation of government programs, as well as educational and extension efforts, the use of 
pasture management practices, including best management practices (BMPs), varies from one 
producer to the next.  Many operators have not adopted pasture management practices, because they 
struggle with prioritizing both farming and conservation adoption (Ellis 2014). Economic, political, 
social, and geographic variables, such as site-specific environmental characteristics, lifestyle choices, 
and attitudes on environmental stewardship, also contribute to why farmers use or do not use pasture 
management practices (Gillespie, Kim, and Paudel 2007; Lambert et al. 2007).  In order to design 
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educational programming or policy to increase pasture management usage, an understanding of the 
factors influencing use and patterns of use is beneficial.   
The objectives of this chapter are to 1) analyze factors influencing the use of ten pasture 
management practices that have proven farm benefits and 2) explore whether or to what extent there 
are patterns in terms of the use of these practices (e.g. whether some more or less tend to be used 
together).  
Literature Review  
 
Studying BMP adoption can be useful in understanding adoption of pasture management 
practices. In addition, BMP adoption and the factors which influence adoption by farmers has been 
extensively researched (Prokopy et al. 2008; Knowler and Bradshaw 2007; Kabii and Horwitz 2006; 
Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress 2012).  For example, Prokopy et al. (2008) examine 55 BMP 
adoption studies published from 1982 to 2007. The authors studied respondents who had previously 
adopted BMPs. Studies of adoption by both livestock and crop farms were included in their literature 
review. The study finds that education levels, farm size, access to information, positive 
environmental attitudes, environmental awareness, and utilization of social networks are often 
positively associated with adoption. The authors found conflicting information on how income and 
age affect adoption rates. In addition, the authors found that the type of statistical analysis used in the 
studies did not affect the results in most cases. Similarly, Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, and Floress 
(2012) analyzed the actual adoption of BMPs in 46 studies published between 1982 and 2007. Of the 
findings relevant to this study, extension and environmental awareness were found to be positively 
related to BMP adoption rates. The effect of age was found to be significant and negative on 
adoption in many of the studies.  
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) reviewed past conservation agriculture (i.e., mostly soil 
conserving) studies to identify factors that could explain adoption. Household income and farm size 
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were among the variables that were positively correlated with adoption. Negatively correlated 
variables included age and off-farm income. As the authors suggested, an increase in off-farm 
income could lead to a decrease in prioritization of agriculture, which could result in a reduced 
interest in soil conservation practices. Financial incentives influenced most producer decisions to use 
conservation agriculture. Kabii and Horwit (2006) examined the factors that influence landowner 
decision-making regarding conservation practices. The authors suggested that farmers are motivated 
to adopt conservation practices if they have more financial flexibility, are more knowledgeable about 
conservation, and farm as a way of life.  
In addition to these literature reviews, some studies focused specifically on the factors that 
influence cattle producer adoption of BMPs (e.g. Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2005; Gillespie, Kim, 
and Paudel 2007). Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel (2005) analyzed the adoption of 16 BMPs by 
Louisiana cattle producers. The authors found that beef cattle producer adoption was relatively low 
compared with other agricultural operations, including dairy operators. Education levels were 
positively correlated with adoption rates. The authors found that age was positively correlated with 
adoption rates. They hypothesized that this was because many of the BMPs had been promoted for 
years. Older producers were more familiar with the BMPs and likely had more time due to retirement 
from off-farm jobs.  
Gillespie, Kim, and Paudel (2007) also studied grazing management practices. Mortality, 
nutrient and pesticide management were found to be the most frequently adopted BMPs among cattle 
producers. The authors noted that these BMPs can have significant economic benefits for the 
producer.  Some common reasons for BMP non-adoption were non-applicability of particular BMPs 
to the farm, unfamiliarity, unaffordability, or time required to implement.  The authors emphasized 
that extension and educational programs designed to promote BMP adoption should provide 
information on the economic and environmental costs and benefits of BMP adoption.  
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Survey Data   
 
 The data for this study came from two versions of a survey of cattle producers. The first 
version focused on the adoption of prescribed grazing, and the second focused on the adoption of 
afforestation.  Both surveys used a random sample of beef cattle, cow/calf, and 
backgrounding/stockering operations in the eight Economic Research Service (ERS) regions east of 
the 100th meridian (figure 6 in appendix C). Thus, producers from the following states are included in 
this study: AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS, 
NC, ND, NE, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA, VT, WI, and WV. The ERS regions 
are based on commodity production, geographical specialization, and other environmental 
similarities. The sample was collected by USDA’s National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) 
and had a 20 head of cattle minimum in order to eliminate hobby farmers. Every individual in the 
sample was randomly assigned to one of the two survey versions. Each version had a sample size of 
8,875 (for a total of 17,750) out of a total 267,413. Each sample represented roughly three percent of 
the total available population (six percent total). The prescribed grazing version had a total of 2,551 
completed surveys, for a 29 percent response rate, and the afforestation version had a total of 2,448 
completed surveys for a response rate of 28 percent.  
Each version of the survey had a similar structure. The survey was divided into three 
sections. The first section (“Your Farming Operation”) included questions about farm size, rental 
terms, and woodland acres owned. The second section (“Prescribed Grazing” or “Afforestation,” 
depending on the version) included questions specific to each version. Respondents’ answers to these 
sections are not included in this analysis as they are not relevant to this analysis. The third section 
(“About You”) asked questions regarding producer characteristics, such as income, age, conservation 
attitudes and hours worked per week.   
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  Included in the “Your Farming Operation” section was a set of questions regarding current 
use of pasture management practices. Responses to these questions are the focus of this chapter. 
Respondents were asked which of a specific list of pasture management practices they used. The 
specific practices considered were: 1) Apply manure as fertilizer to pastures, 2) Apply N, P, or K 
(DAP, urea, LAN, etc) to pasture, 3) Water cattle at site other than stream or pond, 4) Have buffer 
strips of grassy vegetation along waterways, 5) Have shade structures, scratching posts, and feed 
supplements placed away from the streams, 6) Have improved stream crossings, 7) Control livestock 
access to streams, 8) Protect heavy use areas with geotextiles, 9) Replant bare pasture with legumes 
or native grasses, and 10) Periodically test soil. Pasture management practices definitions, mean use 
rates, total pasture acres managed, and a brief summary of possible benefits are found in table 10 in 
appendix C. While most of these practices might be considered BMPs, several are not. For example, 
while in some cases the application of fertilizer or manure is considered a BMP, the survey does not 
specify an amount or use rate. Thus, to call these pasture management practices BMPs, might imply 
more than is contained in the pasture management descriptions.  
 The pasture management practices were divided into three groups based on factor analysis 
results: soil fertility and management (soilfertility), riparian health (riparianhealth), and other 
practices (other). Practices related to soil fertility are npk, soiltest, and replantpasture. Riparian 
health included the following practices: shade, bufferstrips, streamacces, and crossings. Other 
practices are alternativewater, geotextiles, and manure. In addition, table 6 in appendix C shows the 
pasture management practice categories.  
Weights 
To help compensate for producer non-response, post-stratification weights are used in the 
trivariate probit model. The weights are based on each respondent’s ERS region (figure 6 in appendix 
C) and household income. The weights allowed us to predict the number of farms that would be in 
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the same income and regional groups according to the 2007 Agriculture Census. Farms categorized 
in the corresponding ERS region and income group are weighted similarly (Lambert 2014a).  
Statistical Analysis  
 
Means and Associations  
 
 Univariate statistics are used to compare users of pasture management practices with non-
users. For the purposes of this study, “users” are identified as respondents who used at least one out 
of the ten pasture management practices. Assuming unequal variances among the groups in this 
study, t-tests are used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from one another. 
Specifically, the hypothesis tested is the following: does the mean number of pasture acres 
significantly differ between users and non-users of pasture management practices? Unequal variances 
are assumed because a more conservative estimate is produced by not assuming normality of the 
underlying population (Ruxton 2006). The null hypothesis is rejected if the difference in each of the 
variable means is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level.  
Correlation Modeling  
 
Correlation coefficients are used to analyze patterns of pasture management practice use 
across respondents, i.e. which pairs of practices are more or less likely to be used together. 
Spearman’s correlation is used to compare the variables. This is non-parametric and does not assume 
linearity (Spearman 1904). It is hypothesized that use patterns exist among the pasture management 
practices. It is expected that practices in the same group (soilfertility, riparianhealth, and other) will 
exhibit higher correlations than practices across different groups. In addition, current federal 
programs, such as Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), promote certain pasture 
management practices that might be familiar to some respondents. Thus, one might expect that 
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practices supported by incentive or cost share programs to be more likely adopted in tandem, such as 
the use of buffer strips and controlled stream access.  
Adoption Analysis  
 
Random Utility Model 
 
 The Random Utility Model (McFadden 1974) provides a framework for analyzing a discrete 
decision. The choice decision is whether a producer uses a particular pasture management practice. 
Although producer preferences are unobserved, it can be assumed that producers make decisions 
based on the choice that maximizes utility. The Random Utility Model will be used to analyze 
producer use of pasture management practices.  
 A respondent can choose to use or not use a pasture management practice. The variables 
representing pasture management practice use are binary, with 0 denoting non-use and 1 use.  Let K 
represent the ith consumer’s utility for using one of the pasture management practices and K  be the 
utility from not using a pasture management practice. The ith producer will use a pasture 
management practice if  
                      (1)                              K N K 
Because the dependent variables are binary, the ith producer’s use of a pasture management practices 
(K  is  
                                 (2)                           y 0 if >  01 if y> N 0O  
where the latent propensity to use a pasture management practice is y> .  The Random Utility Model 
can be extended to a probabilistic framework: Pr	j  1  Pr	u  ε  u  ε  Pr	ε  ε  
L after the typical normalization      (Greene 2011).    is a vector of parameters, and  
is a matrix of producer characteristics. The probability of using a pasture management practice is 
Pr	  1  !"(L, where !" is a cumulative distribution function of K  (Cooper 1997).  
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A probit model can be used to analyze the use of one pasture management practice, as 
estimated with maximum likelihood   
       (3)                    lnL  ∑ ln Φ	βα     	1  yln 	1  Φ  ] 
where the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution is Φ. Overall 
significance of the model is contained in the Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR) test. The LLR test 
compared the log likelihood from the model with all variables to an intercept-only model. The test 
statistic is LLR=-2(;e;8 – ;e;) where ;8 is the log likelihood of the intercept only model, whereas 
parameters are equal to zero and ; is the log likelihood of the unrestricted model. This test statistic 
is distributed as  variate with k degrees of freedom, where the number of explanatory variables 
included in the model is k (Greene 2011). 
Multivariate Probit Model  
The ten pasture management practices were divided into three groups based on factor 
analysis results. The three pasture management type equations can be estimated using individual 
probit models. However, a multivariate probit model can provide more efficient coefficient estimates 
if the error terms of the individual probit models are correlated (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011). 
A trivariate probit model is used to analyze the effects of producer and farm characteristics on the use 
of pasture management practices among cattle producers (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). Each pasture 
management practice (>, >, U>) response depends on a set of unknown parameters (,, U , a 
vector of farm and producer characteristics (, , U, and the error terms (, , U. The error 
terms contain unobservable factors that explain the probability of choosing a pasture management 
practice in one of the three groups (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011). The three regressions (>, 
>, U>) from equation 4 take the value of 1 if the respondent uses one or more pasture management 
practice from either of the three categories and 0 otherwise. The three equations are coded as binary 
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variables  where j=1, 2 or 3. Y is equal to 1 if a respondent uses one or more of the pasture 
management practices from a particular group.  
(4)                                        >  L  ,     1 	> N 0 
     >  L  ,     1 	> N 0      U>  ULU  U,   U  1 	U> N 0 
 
In the trivariate probit, each of the  are derived from a normal distribution that has a mean 
of 0, and a covariance matrix Ω (equation 5), where the leading diagonal of the matrix is 1. Predicted 
joint probabilities are found using the estimated model coefficients, where ^,, ^,U, ^,U represent 
the unobserved correlation between the stochastic component of each pasture management practice 
(Capellari and Jenkins 2003; Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 2011).               
                      	5                      ?UF ~Z<[ ?
000F , ?
1 ^ ^U^ 1 ^U^U ^U 1 F 
To test overall significance, the LLR test is used. As shown in Capellari and Jenkins (2003) the 
joint estimation of the three equations in (4) is based the evaluation of the loglikelihood function 
        (6)                     ln L= K Kln ΦU	µ, Ω 
Where i=1,…N, N is the sample of independent observations, K is a weight for each observation, 
and  Φ3 is the trivariate normal cumulative density function with arguments µ and Ω.  
                        (7)                   µ=	¢KLK, ¢KLK, ¢KUULKU 
 
¢K  2K  1 , so ¢K equals 1 if a respondent uses a pasture management practice or -1 
otherwise. The constituent elements of matrix Ω are shown in (8) (Giesbert, Steiner, and Bendig 
2011). 
                   	8                       ¥=1 for j= 1, 2, 3 
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Using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm, the trivariate probit model 
estimates normal, multi-dimensional functions (Greene 2003; Capellari and Jenkins 2003). Under 
the above assumptions, the correlation coefficients summarize latent factors that determine the 




Independent variables and their corresponding hypothesized effects on the use of pasture 
management practices are listed in table 12 in appendix C.  It is hypothesized that respondents who 
manage more pasture acres (pastureacres) will be more likely to use pasture management practices. 
Larger operators can reduce the average cost by spreading costs of the practices over more acres 
(Feder et al. 1985). It is expected that a respondent’s household income (income) as well as the 
percent of income from cattle production (cowpercent) will be positively associated with use of 
pasture management practices. Higher income (income) usually indicates a greater flexibility in 
adopting new technologies (Kim, Gillespie and Paudel 2005). In addition, a higher percent of income 
from cattle production could reflect a prioritization of long-run economic efficiency with respect to 
pasture and cattle production (Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2005).  Stocking density (stockdensity) is 
likely to be positively correlated with use of pasture management practices, especially in the 
soilfertility group. If a respondent has a higher stocking rate, the respondent might have a greater 
need for practices that increase soil productivity.  
It is hypothesized that a respondent’s age (age) will be negatively associated with use of 
pasture management practices, while education level, socol and college (highsch is base case) will be 
positively associated with the use of pasture management practices. Prokopy et al. 2008 found that 
older and less educated producers are not as likely to adopt BMPs.  Wu and Babcock (1998) found 
that education was positively associated with adoption rates, thus college and socol are expected to 
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be positive relative to respondents who only attended high school. It is also interesting to note that 
Prokopy et al (2008) found no studies in which educational attainment had a statistically significant 
negative effect on adoption.  
Rahelizatovo (2002) found that dairy producers who have contact with extension are more 
likely to adopt BMPs. Extension is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent has 
attended an extension workshop within the past year, and it is expected to be positively correlated 
with use of pasture management practices.  
  It is expected that a respondent’s future plans will influence use of pasture management 
practices. Producers, whose families will take over farming after their retirement (cease), are 
expected to have higher adoption rates (Kim, Gillespie, and Paudel 2007). It is expected that 
operation of the farm as a sole proprietorships (soleprop) will be positively associated with pasture 
management practice use. It is believed that those respondents who operate independently are more 
likely to adopt conservation measures than a corporate or jointly owned farm.  However, Prokopy et 
al (2008) found that this characteristic was positive and negative in an approximately equal number 
of studies.  
A dummy variable indicates whether a respondent had an off-farm job (offarmdummy). It is 
expected that having an off-farm job will have a negative effect on pasture management practice 
usage. In a study of CRP participation, Lambert, Sullivan, and Classen (2007) found this to be true.  
Respondents who are full-time farmers are more likely to be interested in using practices that 
increase production potential; alternatively, farmers who have off-farm sources of income might 
consider their farming operation to be of somewhat lower priority.   
 Geographical differences are represented by ERS regions. A map of these regions is shown in 
figure 1. There are eight regions (heartland, northerncrescent, northerngreatplains, easternuplands, 
southernseaboard, fruitfulrim, mississippiportal, and prairiegateway).  Several regions are combined 
to account for relatively small number of respondents representing those regions: 
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northerngreatplains with prairiegatway and mississippiportal with southernseaboard. These regional 
variables control for differences in growing seasons, weather conditions, common types of farms, 
and overall cost of production. It is difficult to provide hypothesis for the regional variables, because 
the variety of dimensions in which the regions differ (Allen 1993).  
Rainfall data is represented by total annual rainfall (mm), averaged over 30 years, for the 
respondent’s county. The data was derived by using PRISM GIS data from Oregon State University 
(PRISM 2013).  The average annual amount of precipitation (precip) is expected to be positively 
correlated with use, especially with practices related to the riparianhealth group. The likely effect on 
the soilfertility group is unknown. On one hand, precip and npk might be negatively associated as 
nitrogen leaching can occur with greater amounts of rainfall. However, fertilizer is more effective 
when used with adequate rainfall, so a positive relationship is also feasible.   
Woodland is a discrete variable indicating whether a respondent owns or rents woodland 
acres, grazed and non-grazed. The effect of woodland acreage on pasture management practice use 
has not been previously studied. It is hypothesized that woodland ownership (woodland) will have a 
positive effect on use, assuming that the decision to own and retain woodlands is a conscious 
decision, indicating a conservation ethic. It is hypothesized that respondents who have forested acres 
oftentimes do so because they appreciate the private amenities forests bring, such as hunting 
opportunities, wind protection, aesthetic value, and shade. Public benefits include carbon 
sequestration and increased water quality. Thus, it is hypothesized that respondents who value these 
benefits would also value similar environmental benefits from a productive pasture or healthy stream, 
suggesting a possible positive relationship between woodland acres and usage of pasture 
management practices.  
 Similarly, a proxy variable was developed to reflect a respondent’s state’s attitudes toward 
environmental conservation. If resident of a state in which a respondent resides actively promotes 
conservation behavior, it would be logical to assume that respondents would either reflect or be 
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influenced by these activities.  Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) is a 
certification program which is given to buildings that meet a set of environmentally conscious 
prerequisites (Newsham, Mancini, and Brit 2009). The process of obtaining LEED certification is 
often tedious and expensive. It is hypothesized that people who live in states with a greater square 
foot per capita of LEED certified buildings (LEED) will be more environmentally conscious, which 
should result in a positive relationship between LEED and pasture management practice use. Based 
on layered causality, if a respondent lives in a state that promotes conservation and “green” behavior, 
it is hypothesized that he or she will be more likely to conserve, or for the purposes of this chapter, 
use pasture management practices with demonstrable environmental benefits.  
Finally, Prokopy et al. (2008) found that positive attitudes toward the environment generally 
had a positive effect on adoption rates. Therefore, it is hypothesized that when a respondent feels 
strongly about being a steward of the land (steward), he or she is more likely to use pasture 
management practices.  
Results 
 
As stated above, the overall response rate for the two surveys was approximately 28%. 
Overall, there were 338 respondents who did not use any of the ten pasture management practices, 
and 4,073 respondents who used at least one of the practices. Individual use means of each practice 
can be found in tables 10 and 11 in appendix C.   
Mean comparisons 
 
 Univariate means test was used to test if there was significance difference in the means 
between users and non-users in each group of pasture management practices: soilfertility, 
riparianhealth, and other. The results are located in appendix C in tables 13, 14, and 15.  
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 Of the 22 variables included, only nine variables were found to have significantly difference 
means between users and non-users in all three groups of practices. On average, users of all three 
pasture management groups were younger (age), better educated (college), and have more household 
income (income) than non-users. Users in all three groups were also more likely to attend extension 
workshops (extension), and these respondents are more likely to have woodland (woodland). Those 
respondents who worked off farm (offfarmwork) were more likely to use any of the pasture 
management practices, and stocking density rates (stockdensity) were higher among users as well. 
The only regional variable that was consistently significant throughout all pasture management 
practice groups was the ERS region prairiegateway.   
 Pastureacres and socol were the only variables in which there were no significant differences 
in means between users and non-users for any of the pasture management practice groups.   
Spearman correlations 
 
An analysis using Spearman correlations suggests that low-to-moderate correlations exist 
between the use of pasture management practices. It is interesting to note that while the correlations 
are relatively low, no correlation was found to be negative.  Results of Spearman correlations are 
found in table 16 in appendix C.  
In the soilfertility group, soil testing, testsoil, had a moderate correlation (0.364) with npk. 
Testsoil and npk also had a moderate correlation with replantpasture, 0.373 and 0.262, respectively.  
In the riparianhealth group, Bufferstrips and streamaccess had the strongest relative relationship 
with a correlation of 0.375, indicating that these two pasture management practices are used together 
somewhat frequently. In addition, bufferstrips also had a moderately strong positive relationship with 
shade (0.325) and crossings (0.311). Crossings had a moderate positive relationship with 
streamaccess (0.343). Bufferstrips, crossings, shade, and streamaccess are conservation intensive 
pasture management practices and all contribute to maintaining riparian and stream health. Thus it 
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can be assumed that if a producer sees the benefit of adding buffer strips, he or she will also derive 
benefit from controlling stream crossings and access. These correlations could also indicate the 
presence of a stream. The practices included in the other group all have low correlations with one 
another, indicating that these practices are not necessarily used together.  
Multivarirate probit  
 
The results of the trivariate probit model are provided in table 17 of appendix C. Three 
dependent variables were included in the model: soilmanagement, riparianhealth, and other. Each 
pasture management practice group was tested against the same set of variables. The model as a 
whole is statistically significant (p<0.01), meaning that the unrestricted model fits better than a 
model with no predictors. The correlations between error terms were found positive and significant in 
each equation.  
Soil fertility practices 
 Of the 19 variables included in the soilfertility equation, 12 were positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level.  Respondents who attended (socol) or graduated from college (college) were 
more likely to use practices related to soil fertility than respondents who only attended or graduated 
high school.  Respondents with higher incomes (income) are more likely to use this group of 
practices. 
 The more densely a producer stocks his cattle (stockdensity), the greater the chance of soil 
fertility use. If a respondent has a higher stocking density, there could be a greater need for these 
practices due to an overuse of resources. In addition, the greater the percent of income from cattle a 
respondent has (cowpercent), the more likely he or she is to use soil fertility practices. In addition, 
respondents who own woodland (ownwood) are more likely to use soil fertility practices. 
 If a respondent believed strongly in acting as a steward of the land (steward), he or she is 
more likely to use the soilfertility pasture management practices. Also, the variable representing the 
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amount of LEED certified buildings per state (LEED) was found to be a significant influence on the 
use of soil fertility practices. If a respondent lives in a state with more LEED certified buildings per 
person, he or she is more likely to use soil fertility practices. Respondents who attended at least one 
extension workshop in the past year (extension) were found to be more likely to use this group of 
practices.  
Several regional and geographic variables were found significant. Respondents from the 
heartland (heartland) and eastern uplands (easternuplands) are more likely to use soil fertility 
practices than respondents from the prairiegateway region. The heartland region has the highest 
value of production of any region, which could indicate that pastureland in this area is overused and 
in need of soil fertility practices to maintain high levels of production.  In addition, the amount of 
precipitation (precip) was found to be positively related to soil fertility practices.  
Riparian health practices 
 Six of the 19 variables included in riparianhealth equation were found to be significant. 
Unlike with the soilfertility group, regional variables were not found to have an effect on practices 
related to riparian health (riparianhealth).  Age (age) has a negative effect and income (income) has 
a positive effect on the use of riparian health practices. Attendance of extension workshops 
(extension) has a significant positive relationship with these practices. Similarly to soilfertility, 
extension workshops often provide services, education, and materials for producers to improve farm 
health and production.  
As in practices related to soil fertility, the amount of precipitation (precip) is positively 
related to the use of riparian health practices. This could be because if a respondent lives in an area 
with more precipitation, there is an increased likelihood that there would be a running stream on his 
or her property.  In addition, the more pasture acres a respondent manages (pastureacres), the greater 
the likelihood the respondent uses a riparian health practice. If a respondent has woodland 
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(woodland), he or she is more likely to use this set of practices. This relationship is logical, because 
trees can act as buffer strips, offer shade, and control cattle’s access to streams.  
Other practices 
Of the 19 variables included in the other practices equation, which are alternativewater, 
manure, and geotextiles, 12 were found to have a significant effect. Unlike with the other two groups, 
precipitation (precip) has a negative effect on other pasture management practices. The change of 
signs could be explained by the possible negative correlation between precipitation amounts and the 
use of alternativewater.  Those respondents who use an alternative water source might do so because 
of the lack of precipitation. The amount of pasture acres (pastureacres) positively affects the use of 
other practices. For example, if a respondent has more pasture, it might be more convenient to 
recycle manure over many acres. In addition, more pasture acres might imply a greater need for 
supplemental water sources. Woodland acres (woodland), percent of income from cattle 
(cowpercent), and stocking density (stockdensity) also have a positive effect.  
As in the riparianhealth equation, age (age) has a negative effect on use of other pasture 
management practices. Respondents, who are older, might be getting ready for retirement and not 
interested in investing time and money into using a new pasture management practice. Respondents 
who attended at least one extension workshop (extension) were found to be more likely to use this 
group of pasture management practices.  
 Compared with prairiegateway, all of the ERS regions (heartland, easternuplands, 
southernseaboard, northercrescent, and fruitfulrim) were found to have a positive effect on the use 
of other pasture management practices.  
 Between the three different groups of pasture management practices, only three variables 
were significant throughout: extension, precip, and woodland. Extension and woodland were positive 
in all three while precip was positive in both the soilfertility and riparianhealth equations but 




Pasture management practices can provide many benefits including increased soil and water 
quality, higher land productivity, improved forage, and decreased bank erosion, among many others. 
The usage of pasture management practices is not consistent among producers, as indicated by the 
means listed in table 9 of appendix C. This inconsistency could be due to time constraints, costs, and 
lack of familiarity of the practice.  
Almost 4,000 producers were asked whether or not they used ten different pasture 
management practices. The most commonly used practices were the use of shade structures away 
from water and alternative water sources. The least common was the use of geotextiles. As shown by 
the means testing, many producer characteristics differed between user and non-users.  Using factor 
analysis, the pasture management practices were sorted into three groups: soil fertility, riparian 
health, and other practices. In most cases, the practices included in each management group had a 
moderate correlation which one another, as shown by the spearman coefficients.  Each group of 
pasture management practices was found to be significantly affected by a different set of producer 
and farm characteristics. The significance of the amount of LEED certified square feet per capita in 
the soil fertility group of pasture management practices could indicate that producers are influenced 
by local public attitudes. There were several variables that significantly influenced each equation in 
the trivariate probit model: attendance of extension workshops, precipitation amount, and ownership 
of woodland acres.  
 For future research, it would be interesting to explore how a running stream on a 
respondent’s property affects the use of the pasture management practice groups. In addition, 
analyzing how incentives affect use of pasture management practices could also provide insight into 






Allen, V. 1993. Managing Replacement Stock Within the Environment of the South-Plant, Soil, and 
 Animal Interactions: A Review. Journal of Animal Science 71(11): 3164-3171 
 
Bauman-Getz, A., L.S. Prokopy, and K. Floress. 2012. “Why Farmers Adopt Best Management  
Practices in the United States: A Meta-Analysis of the Adoption Literature.” Journal of  
Environmental Management 96: 17-25.  
 
Bray, R.H. 1945. Soil-Plant Relations: Balanced Fertilizer Use Through Soil Tests for Potassium and 
 Phosphoru. Soil Science 60(6): 463-474 
 
Cappellari, L., & Jenkins, S. P. 2003. Multivariate Probit Regression Using Simulated 
 Maximum Likelihood. The Stata Journal, 3(3): 278-294.  
 
Feder, G., Just, R. E., & Zilberman, D. 1985. Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing 
 Countries: A Survey. Economic Development and Cultural Change 22(2): 255-298.  
 
Edwards, D., Daniel, T., Scott, H., Murdoch, J., Habiger, M., & Burks, H. 1996. Stream Quality 
 Impacts of Best Management Practices in Northwestern Arkansas: Wiley Online Library. 
 
Ellis, Chad. 2014. Grazing Management Benefits Cattle and Deer. AgNews and Views.  The Samuel 
 Roberts Noble Foundation 
 
Environmental Protection Agency. 2014. Non-Point Source Pollution: The Nation’s Largest Water 
 Quality Problem. Water Outreach and Communication. EPA841-F-96-004A 
 
Giesbert, L., Steiner, S., & Bendig, M. 2011. Participation in Micro Life Insurance and the Use of 
 Other Financial Services in Ghana. Journal of Risk and Insurance 78(1): 7-35.  
Gillespie, J., S. Kim, and K. Paudel. 2007. Why Don't Producers Adopt Best Management Practices? 
 An Analysis of the Beef Cattle Industry. Agricultural Economics 36(1):89-102. 
Greene, W.H. 2003. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Greene, W.H. 2011. Econometric Analysis, 7th edition. Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall 
Holt, Caroline Elizabeth. 2013. Producers Willingness to Adopt a Prescribed Grazing System East of 
 the 100th Meridian. Master’s Thesis. University of Tennessee, 2013.  
Kabii, T., and P. Horwitz. 2006. A Review of Landholder Motivations and Determinants for 
 Participation in Conservation Covenanting Programmes. Environmental Conservation 
 33(1):11-20. 
Kim, S., J.M. Gillespie, and K.P. Paudel. 2005. The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on the 
 Adoption of Best Management Practices in Beef Cattle Production. Journal of Soil and Water 
 Conservation 60(3):111-120. 
Knowler, D., and B. Bradshaw. 2007. Farmers' Adoption of Conservation Agriculture: A Review and 
 Synthesis of Recent Research. Food Policy 32(1):25-48. 
78 
 
Lambert, D.M., C.D. Clark, F.R. Walker, S.L. Larkin, J.A. Larson D.F. Mooney, R.K. Roberts, M.  
 Velandia, J.M. Reeves. 2014a. Adoption and Frequency of Precision Soil Testing in Cotton 
 Production. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 39(1):115-132 
Lambert, D.M., P. Sullivan, and R. Claassen. 2007. Working Farm Participation and Acreage 
 Enrollment in the Conservation Reserve Program. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
 Economics 39(1):151-169. 
Lambert, D.M., P. Sullivan, R. Claassen, and L. Foreman. 2007. Profiles of US farm Households 
 Adopting Conservation-Compatible Practices. Land Use Policy 24(1):72-88. 
Lemus, R. 2008. Pasture Management and Grazing Guide for Livestock Producers. Mississippi State 
 University Extension Services. http://msucares.com/pubs/publications/p2459.pdf 
McFadden, D. 1974 Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In Frontiers in 
 Econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka, New York: Academic Press. pp. 105-42 
Newsham, G. R., Mancini, S., & Birt, B. J. 2009. Do LEED-Certified Buildings Save Energy? Yes, 
 but…. Energy and Buildings 41(8): 897-905.   
  
Plantinga, A.J., R. Alig, and H.-T. Cheng. 2001. The Supply of Land for Conservation Uses: 
 Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program. Resources, Conservation and Recycling  
 31(3):199-215.  
PRISM Climate Group. 2013. 30-year Normal Precipitation: Annual. Oregon State University. 
Prokopy, L., K. Floress, D. Klotthor-Weinkauf, and A. Baumgart-Getz. 2008. Determinants of 
 Agricultural Best Management Practice Adoption: Evidence from the literature. Journal 
 of Soil and Water Conservation 63(5):300-311. 
Rahelizatovo, N. C., & Gillespie, J. M. 2004. The Adoption of Best-management Practices by 
 Louisiana Dairy Producers. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 36(1):  229-240.  
 
Ruxton, Graeme D. 2006. The Unequal Variance T-Test is an Underused Alternative to Student’s T-
 Test and the Mann-Whitney U Test. Behavioral Ecology 17(4): 688-690 
 
Spearman, C. 1904. The Proof and Measurement of Association Between Two Things. The American 
 Journal of Psychology 15(1):72-101.  
 
Wu, J., & Babcock, B. A. 1998. The Choice of Tillage, Rotation, and Soil Testing Practices: 
 Economic and Environmental Implications. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 









Table 10: Descriptions of Pasture Management Practices (n=3106)  
 





soilfertility     
npk 
Apply N,P, or K 
fertilizer to pastures 
0.51 88.90 
Improve forage quality, increase 
production, increase legume 
species growth. 
testsoil Periodically test soil 0.49 85.19 
Help decide how much fertilizer 
needed to improve productivity 
replantpasture 
Replant bare pasture 
with legumes or 
native grasses 
0.41 72.46 
Increase production, maintain soil 
quality, increase water quality 




posts, and feed 
supplements placed 
away from streams 
0.60 102.11 
Increased water quality, decrease 
soil erosion and compaction, 





Promote uniform grazing, decrease 
stream bank erosion, improve 




access to streams 
0.20 34.43 
Lessen sediment pollution, 
decrease erosion, improve water 
quality, and increase health of 
stream vegetation 
bufferstrip 
Have buffer strips of 




Filter for pollutants, increase water 
quality, and maintain water banks. 
other     
manure 
Apply Manure as 
fertilizer to pastures 
0.41 67.79 
Manure can recycle nutrients, 




Water cattle at site 
other than stream or 
pond 
0.60 106.41 
Decrease stream or pond bank 
erosion, improve water quality, and 
maintain health and productivity of 
farm. 
geotextiles 
Protect heavy use 
areas with geotextiles 
0.08 13.78 
Provides a stable and non-eroding 
surface, decrease mud 
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Table 11:  Pasture Management Practice Groups and Mean Use in ERS regions  
 Pasture Management Practice Groups  
ERS Region soilfertility riparianhealth other 
heartland 0.8201 0.7306 0.8161 
prairiegateway  0.5744 0.6686 0.6765 
southernseaboard 0.8059 0.7521 0.7516 
northerngreatplains 0.2976 0.6905 0.7500 
easternuplands 0.7959 0.7059 0.7273 






























pastureacres number of total acres 
farmed (100s) 
- 1 65,720 
age respondent’s age - 15 95 
income 1 if respondent’s total 
income is less than 
$10,000; 2 if respondent’s 
income is between $10,000 
and $29,000; 3 if 
respondent’s income is 
between $30,000 and 
$49,999; 4 if respondent’s 
income is between $50,000 
and $99,999; 5 if 
respondent’s income is 
between $100,000 and 
$149,000; 6 if respondent’s 
income is between 
$150,000 and $199,000; 7 
if respondent’s income is 
between $200,000 and 
$499,999; 8 if respondent’s 
income is greater than 
$500,000 
+ 1 8 
cowpercent Share or respondent’s 
percent of income that 
comes from cattle 
+ -10 100 
extension 1 if respondent attended 
any extension workshops in 
2012; 0 otherwise 
+ 0 1 
highsch 1 if respondent attended 
only high school; 0 
otherwise 
omitted 
socol 1 if respondent attended 
some college but did not 
graduate; 0 otherwise 
- 0 1 
college 1 if respondent graduated 
from college; 0 otherwise 
 0 1 
offfarmdummy 1 if respondent works off 
farm; 0 only on farm 
- 0 1 
woodland 1 if respondent owns 
woodland; 0 otherwise 
+ 0 1 
soleprop 1 if farm operated as “sole 
proprietorship;” 0 
otherwise 
+ 0 1 
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steward 1 if strongly disagree; 2 if 
somewhat disagree; 3 if no 
opinion; 4 if somewhat 
agree; 5 if strongly agree 
+ 0 1 
cease 1 if respondent’s 
children/grandchildren will 
farm land after they he/she 
ceases farming 
+ 0 1 
J+R(¦9)HJG+ Stocking Rate: (.92*cows+ 






total number of pasture 
acres farmed 
 0 27.83 
LEED square foot per person by 
state 
+ 0.28 2.29 
precip annual rainfall per year 
(mm) 
+ 454.86 1794.30 
heartland 0,1 ERS region n/a 0 1 
northerncrescent 0,1 ERS region n/a 0 1 
prairiegateway  
(base case) 
0,1 ERS region omitted 
easternuplands 0,1 ERS region n/a 0 1 
southernseaboard 0,1 ERS region n/a 0 1 
fruitfulrim 0,1 ERS region n/a 0 1 



















Table 13: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of 
Users and Non-Users of Practices in the soilfertility Group  












pastureacres 306.71 305.13  316.37  
age 62.74 62.32  63.44  ** 
income (a) 3.97 4.03  3.79  *** 
cowpercent 34.57 36.64  31.62  *** 
extension 0.30 0.35  0.16  *** 
highsch 0.41 0.39  0.47  *** 
socol 0.23 0.23  0.22   
college 0.36 0.38  0.30  *** 
offfarmdummy 0.49 0.51  0.45  ** 
stockdensity 0.57 0.63  0.46  *** 
woodland 0.58 0.63  0.45  *** 
soleprop 0.79 0.78  0.82  ** 
steward (b) 4.58 4.62  4.49  *** 
cease 0.62 0.63  0.60   
LEEDcert 0.95 0.96  0.93   
precip 1080.50 1111.94  995.27  *** 
heartland 0.21 0.23  0.14  *** 
northerngreatplains 0.03 0.01  0.07  *** 
easternuplands 0.31 0.32  0.24  *** 
prairiegateway 0.21 0.16  0.35  *** 
southernseaboard 0.19 0.20  0.14  *** 
fruitfulrim 0.03 0.03  0.04   
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level  
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – 
$49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = 
$2,000 - $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more 
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 = 








Table 14: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of 
Users and Non-Users of Practices in the riparianhealth Group  












pastureacres 306.71 271.43 395.94  
age 62.74 62.18 63.75 *** 
income (a) 3.97 4.04 3.79  *** 
cowpercent 34.57 35.69 34.48   
extension 0.30 0.34 0.22  *** 
highsch 0.41 0.39 0.47  *** 
socol 0.23 0.23 0.23   
college 0.36 0.37 0.33  *** 
offfarmdummy 0.49 0.51 0.47  *** 
stockdensity 0.57 0.62 0.52  *** 
woodland 0.58 0.62 0.49  *** 
soleprop 0.79 0.78 0.81   
steward (b) 4.58 4.61 4.54  * 
cease 0.62 0.63 0.61  ** 
LEEDcert 0.95 0.96 0.92  ** 
precip 1080.50 1089.67 1064.38  *** 
heartland 0.21 0.21 0.19   
northerngreatplains 0.03 0.02 0.03   
easternuplands 0.31 0.30 0.31   
prairiegateway 0.21 0.17 0.22  *** 
southernseaboard 0.19 0.14 0.10  *** 
fruitfulrim 0.03 0.03 0.04   
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level  
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – 
$49,000, 4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = 
$2,000 - $499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more 
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 = 









Table 15: Means of Producer Characteristics and T-Tests of Difference in Means of Users 
and Non-Users of Practices in the other Group  











pastureacres 306.71 275.84  402.32   
age 62.74 62.21  63.94 *** 
oncome (a) 3.97 4.02  3.80  *** 
cowpercent 34.57 36.19  32.69 ** 
extension 0.30 0.34  0.22  *** 
highsch 0.41 0.40  0.45  *** 
socol 0.23 0.23  0.23   
college 0.36 0.38  0.32  *** 
offfarmdummy 0.49 0.46 0.51  *** 
stockdensity 0.57 0.63  0.44  *** 
woodland 0.58 0.59  0.54  *** 
soleprop 0.79 0.79  0.79   
steward (b) 4.58 4.59  4.57   
cease 0.62 0.62  0.62   
LEEDcert 0.95 0.96  0.92  ** 
precip 1080.50 1078.80  1092.52   
heartland 0.21 0.22  0.15  *** 
northerngreatplains 0.03 0.03  0.03   
easternuplands 0.31 0.29  0.33  *** 
prairiegateway 0.21 0.19  0.27  *** 
southernseaboard 0.19 0.18  0.19   
fruitfulrim 0.03 0.04  0.02  *** 
Notes: means are shown in the parentheses  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level  
a: Likert scale of income: 1 = less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 - $29,000, 3 = $30,000 – $49,000, 
4 = $50,000 - $99,000, 5 = $100,000 - $149,999, 6 = $150,000 - $199,999, 7 = $2,000 - 
$499,999, 8 = $500,000 or more 
b: Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = no opinion, 4 = somewhat 














































manure 1.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
npk 0.028 1.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
alternative-
ewater 0.131 0.128 1.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
bufferstrips 0.152 0.145 0.186 1.000 -- -- -- -- -- 
shade 0.105 0.143 0.208 0.325 1.000 -- -- -- -- 
crossings 0.114 0.089 0.127 0.311 0.212 1.000 -- -- -- 
streamacc-
ess 0.140 0.115 0.196 0.375 0.232 0.343 1.000 -- -- 
geotextiles 0.130 0.120 0.171 0.216 0.136 0.205 0.274 1.000 -- 
Replantpas-
ture 0.201 0.262 0.168 0.256 0.264 0.212 0.240 0.226 1.000 
testsoil 0.184 0.364 0.166 0.265 0.213 0.178 0.235 0.230 0.373 
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Table 17: Trivariate Probit Results and Estimated Coefficients  
Pasture Management Practice Groups (n=3190) 
























































































































(0.2818)*** ^ 0.3710***  ^U 0.2702*** LLR Test -267571.28*** ^U 0.3306*** 






















 As the literature shows, cattle producer decision making process is oftentimes different 
from their other crop and animal producers. This paper explored two different aspects of cattle 
producers: the adoption of afforestation in a hypothetical program and the use of pasture 
management practices. Chapter 1 found that producers who are interested in afforestation are 
more likely to have a college degree, own woodland, attend extension workshops, and have 
previous afforestation experience. It was also concluded that producers who are offered a lower 
incentive enrolled more acres in the afforestation program while those who were offered a higher 
incentive enrolled less acres. Chapter 2 looked at the use of ten pasture management practices. 
These ten practices were then divided into three subgroups based on the type of practice: riparian 
health, soil fertility management, and other types of practices. Ownership of woodland, extension 
workshop attendance, and precipitation were found to be significant in all three equations.  
 As shown by the results, extension workshops have a positive effect on the conservation 
behavior of cattle producers. Therefore, if policymakers want to increase producer participation, 
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